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by Gabrielle Anderson
Correctly developing multi-threaded programs is notoriously dicult, and getting total
coverage using traditional testing paradigms, to guarantee the program is correct, is often
infeasible. We expand on previous work to provide various tools, namely a generalisation
of session typing and an extension of policy automata to multi-threaded code, with
which to verify multi-threaded code. Additionally, most programs are not written once
and then left; maintaining and updating software is an essential part of the software
development cycle. Dynamic software update (DSU) \is a technique by which a running
program can be updated with new code and data without interrupting its execution" [45]
and uses code analyses to ensure given safety properties are maintained across update
boundaries. We present techniques for verifying if a modication can be applied to a
running program whilst maintaining the desired behavioural properties, which may be
those the program had before or some new properties.Contents
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Introduction
Correctly developing multi-threaded programs is notoriously dicult. On one hand there
are the traditional problems of deadlock and livelock, which are general problems which
most programmers wish to exclude. On the other hand are the actual properties which
the program should have, such as communicating according to a protocol or maintaining
separation of information which would lead to a conict of interest. Additionally, whilst
establishing behavioural properties for software is necessary, software also requires up-
dates. It may be to x bugs, add functionality, or simply make the system more ecient
but software requirements are rarely static and systems are never perfect. In this thesis
we present two approaches for dening behavioural properties for multi-threaded pro-
grams, and DSU techniques to permit modifying code at runtime whilst maintaining
these properties.
In a realistic system, in order to safely use the values returned when accessing shared
resources we must know something about their type. Traditionally values obtained
from shared resources such as channels and shared memory have either been treated
as top or are assumed to be of one specic type [32]. Work on session typing has
pioneered an approach to allow values of dierent types to be safely sent and received on
a channel [10,21,28,29,43,46,48]. We expand this formalism to generalised resources and
resource accesses, where a resource access can return values of dierent types. We expose
the essence of prior formalisms and proofs and discuss how we believe this approach can
simplify the myriad dierent proofs for dierent session typing systems.
There are many behavioural properties which can be described using policy automata.
These automata decide whether the side eects of a program conform to some pro-
grammer dened property. Examples of such properties include correct use of mutual
exclusion, prevention of spoong attacks by web servers, enforcing Chinese Wall prop-
erties, and prevention of denial of service attacks. We extend previous work on local
access policies [3{7] to multi-threaded programs by representing multi-threaded eects
using trace-equivalent single-threaded eects. We also exploit the insight that we need
1only model check for safety with respects to some policy up until the point an execu-
tion becomes blocked, which can signicantly reduce the space which needs to be model
checked.
The standard method used to update software is to stop running the code, change the
code in an arbitrary manner, then restart the program. This methodology is at best
intrusive and disruptive and at worst catastrophic. The restart causes an interruption
to service which can simply be inconvenience, for example when using a PC, but in
some systems is simply unacceptable. Additionally, even if it is possible to take down
the service for updating, the changes are made in an arbitrary manner and there are
no guarantees the system will come back online or will continue to have the desirable
behaviour. Hence stronger guarantees about system behaviour, both in the process of
application and the resulting system, are required for system safety.
An example of when it would have been desirable to update a system but it was impossi-
ble since it would have interrupted a non-redundant service is the ESA Cassini-Huygens
probe to Titan. After launch a programmer error in software was discovered that pre-
vented one of the two receivers on Cassini from being used. This prevented the orbital
Cassini from receiving data from the Huygens probe, and a loss of half of the photos
taken by the probe. It was not possible to take down the control software running the
orbiter as it would have risked careening out of control. However if it had been possible
to update the software whilst it was still running it might have been possible to return
the orbiter to full functionality.
The above example demonstrates what problems can occur when one cannot modify run-
ning software or when one makes unconstrained changes. Whilst it is possible to write
unconstrained updates which modify live code and don't cause errors, to do so consis-
tently requires great skill on the part of the programmer and often is mere serendipity.
Hence in order to free the programmer from such accidental complexity [15] we can de-
velop static analyses (generally included in compilers) which indicate when such errors
will probably happen. Dynamic software update (hereafter referred to as DSU) often
makes use of formal approaches to modifying software whilst it is still running. The
goal of DSU is to permit modication of software without shutting down the system,
and guaranteeing that some safety property of the system which held before the update
holds after the update. This removes for the programmer the complexity of having to
worry about the safety of her patch, as such an analysis will guarantee it.
In several papers [13,26,37{39,44] the authors present formal analyses with simple type
safety guarantees for DSU for both single-threaded and multi-threaded execution. De-
signing multi-threaded systems is non-trivial as the standard problems for such systems
include synchronisation issues, deadlock and race conditions. We hence extend DSU to
behavioural properties which are crucial for multi-threaded program development.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we present background material and
2related literature. In Chapter 3 we present resource access with variably typed return,
which is a generalisation of session typing and message passing systems. This work
reveals the essence of session typing analysis and we hope it will lead to simpler proofs
for related systems. In Chapter 4 we expand work on local access policies for side
eecting systems from single-threaded to multi-threaded programs. We show how to
represent multi-threaded eects in trace equivalent single-threaded eects and how to
reduce the search space by ignoring blocked traces. In Chapter 5 we present our work
on dynamically updating multi-threaded programs whilst preserving their behavioural
properties. We dene a runtime safety analysis and outline how we intend to expand
the work to a more ecient, static analysis. We conclude in Chapter 6.
3Chapter 2
Background Material and
Literature
2.1 Static Analyses and Type Systems
The concept of safety has already been introduced in passing. Pierce suggests that:
Safety refers to the language's ability to guarantee the integrity of [machine
service] abstractions and of higher-level abstractions introduced by the pro-
grammer using the denitional facilities of the language. [41]
There are many such abstractions ranging from synchronisation and mutual exclusion
primitives to function application to array access depending on the language being dis-
cussed. It is desirable to maintain such abstractions, and there are several methods used
to try to guarantee safety.
Some languages provide no guarantees that a particular program adheres to such ab-
stractions. These are generally un-typed languages or languages where the type system
can be `switched o'. Writing a program in such a language and expecting it to be safe
(using the standard meaning of type safety) corresponds to the hypothetical approach
to DSU of hand crafting updates and expecting them to safely modify code without re-
quiring restarting or causing errors. It is possible to create safe updates in this way but
it requires the programmer to keep many low level details in her head and to design her
program accordingly. This is not a methodology which will lead to eective or ecient
software engineering practices.
Safe languages perform analyses to ensure that the abstractions are respected. These
analyses can either be performed at compile time or at runtime, thence being known as
static and dynamic analyses respectively. Dynamic analyses are less conservative than
5static ones (with regards to which safe programs they reject) as they analyse runtime
data and values rather than abstract syntax trees. As dynamic analyses perform their
checks at runtime they add runtime overhead. Static analyses perform their checks at
compile time and hence will always be conservative, as determining control ow can in
many languages be reducible to the Halting Problem. They do however permit errors
to be detected and corrected before deployment of the software.
Type systems are generally static analyses and are described by Pierce as:
A tractable syntactic method for proving the absence of certain program
behaviours by classifying phrases according to the kinds of values they com-
pute. [41]
This methodology is generally reliant upon a program having structural operational
semantics; this is the concept dened by Plotkin that the behaviour of an expression
is dened completely by the composition of the behaviour of its sub-expressions [42].
Behaviour which is not dened in this way is labelled emergent, and is more dicult
to reason about and often considered unsafe. An example of such behaviour is race
conditions which, whilst they sometimes can be used in a reliable way, programmers
often try to prevent. Such typing analyses generally will use this composability and
structural inductive methods to guarantee safety properties.
It could be argued that dynamic analyses would be most appropriate in such a setting.
These could provide a system which didn't have to restart to update and would never
apply a corrupting update. They would also probably be less conservative with respects
to which updates were rejected as unsafe. As a programming tool, however, they would
be probably be less useful as the programmer would have to wait until she attempted to
apply the update to the system before she discovered if the update was fundamentally
incompatible with the system, and hence needed to be rewritten. Static analyses can
examine the oine source code and the source of the update and determine whether
the update would be always, occasionally or never compatible with the program. This
information could then be brought to the attention of the programmer who could modify
her update accordingly. Hence static analyses are an important tool in order to write
updates for DSU.
2.2 Session Typing
Session typing is a family of static typing analyses which permit verication that a
set of processes communicate according to a specied protocol. Traditionally session
typing has focused on verifying dyadic interactions, which is of limited use in a multi-
threaded system with an arbitrary number of threads. The formal underpinnings of
6session typing have been studied since the early 1990s [27,28], though recently some
errors in the foundational paper have been discovered and corrected [48].
Whilst the work in the majority of papers on session types uses  calculus style calculi
[11,27,29,35,48], in some a  calculus formulation is used [22,23], which is closer to
the conventional programming languages which would be employed in a DSU situation.
In [22] the authors provide subtyping for session types, whilst in [23] the authors include
a linear type system and permit aliasing of variables referring to channels. In neither
paper do the authors satisfactorily handle functions with communicative side-eects as
they only permit functions which make tail calls. This is in order to simplify the type and
eect analysis as in such a case one does not have to account for nested behaviour. The
work in [22,23] provides a useful starting point for session types for more conventional
languages.
In [11,29] the authors generalise the session typing to sessions which can include more
than two parties (multi-party session typing) in a  calculus paradigm. They also
introduce the important concept of delegation, where an entity A can pass responsibility
for performing certain actions within a session on to entity B. However the formulation
of this in [29] was such that the delegation was not completely transparent. This could
expose implementation details of the delegator to the delegate which could be either
technically or commercially undesirable. This also would reduce generalisability and
possible updates to systems, which would be especially problematic for DSU systems.
In [11] however the authors deal with the above limitations and provide the rst robust,
multi-party, session type system. They also provide a new guarantee of global progress,
that a well typed system will not experience deadlock part way through a session due
to the communications.
The authors of [11,29] introduce the concept of global session types. These specify in
a high level manner the protocol according to which the participant (known as a role)
must communicate. The global view can be projected down to the local view of each
role and how it should communicate with the other roles. The local view is a session
type, as dened in the majority of the session typing literature [11,22,23,27,29,35,48].
In this work the communications mechanisms are expanded to include multicast sending
and channel transmission which is session delegation.
In a system where threads can interact we require additional safety properties, in order to
prevent emergent behaviour. In a message passing system (with no shared memory) the
only way which threads can interact with or aect each other is by their communications.
Hence if we could prove safety properties with respects to the communications across
update boundaries then we could update individual or groups of threads and prevent
unsafe emergent behaviour.
72.3 Access Policies
In [32] the authors present a type system for ensuring that resources are accessed accord-
ing to predened patterns. This is a formulaically elegant and general analysis which
could be used in many diverse situations. Hypothetically the analysis in [32], slightly
modied to ensure complementary actions between roles, could be used as a session
typing system. The analysis in [32] could also probably be used to control and validate
shared memory access. This work, however, only considers single-threaded functional
programs, and only permits specifying policies on single resources.
Extensive work has been done on validating correct use of resources with respect to local
automata policies [3,5{7]. This work permits policies to be specied with respects to
multiple resources, which can be both static or dynamic (created at runtime). In [5]
the authors present the concept of local policies, which only take account of specic
actions on specic resources - all other actions are ignored. This approach allows a
policy designer to focus on the property they are interested rather than the global state
of available resources, as previous approaches have done [8]. In [3, 6, 7] the authors
present a methodology for eciently model checking the policies against the actions of a
program. Of particular note is their approach of transforming resource usages into Basic
Process Algebras and using a weakened form of model checking to make their approach
complete as well as sound. The authors posit that their approach could be simply
extended to multi-threaded programs by transforming into Basic Parallel Processes [18]
rather than BPAs [7]. Recent work in equivalence decidability [30], however, shows
that trace equivalence, on which their approach is based, is undecidable for BPPs. We
instead look at representing the behaviour of multi-threaded programs as the behaviour
of single-threaded programs, which can be transformed to BPAs as in [7].
A lot of other research has been done on usage policies and their enforcement mechanisms
which is not relevant to this thesis. For a fuller review of the area see [3].
2.4 Dynamic Software Updating
In this section we present the relevant literature to DSU. Particularly we emphasise how
the formal approaches in [37,45] are thorough and suitably general for simple typing in
single-threaded programs and multi-threaded programs respectively. We posit, however,
that simple typing is insucient to describe the safety properties often required for multi-
threaded programs, and describe how no current work exists for dynamically modifying
formal behavioural properties of multi-threaded code. We refer to multi-threaded DSU
as MDSU.
An early example of DSU is Erlang [2]. Erlang is a dynamically typed language designed
for distributed and concurrent programs in telephone systems which often need to be
8Main Loop Original Function
Denitions: f1();g1()
Function Denitions
After Update: f2();g2()
1 main
2 do
3 ...
4 g()
5 ...
6 update
7 ...
8 f()
9 ...
10 loop
f() =
...
update_log()
...
g() =
...
f() =
...
g() =
...
update_log()
...
Figure 2.1: Update causing skipped log entry
modied. Its programs can have up to two versions of a module loaded, `new' and `old'.
Running code can refer to either the `new' or the `old' version, but by default refers to
the `new' version. If a newer version comes in any thread referring to the `old' module
is terminated (as the previous `new' becomes the current `old' and the previous `old' is
simply unloaded). Updates in Erlang are made safe by dynamic analyses which are not
formally dened.
The work in [12] is the rst attempt to apply static analysis techniques to DSU. The au-
thors present a rst-order, simply-typed, call-by-value lambda calculus, with the addition
of a module system and an update primitive. In many ways the work is a generalisation
of the dynamic module system used in Erlang in that the programmer can introduce new
versions of modules and that by default code refers to the most recent version. There
is however no limit on how many versions of a module the system can have loaded, and
code can make explicit which module versions it is willing to use. The authors present
an update system which guarantees type safety of code using dierent module versions.
9This is a useful starting point to formally approaching DSU, particularly the infrastruc-
ture to permit the programmer to use multiple versions of a module. The granularity of
an update is the module, which means that by an update one swaps in a new module
(but a single update can modify multiple modules). A module can encapsulate many
functions, and it seems slightly spurious to have to provide code for all the functions in
a new module when only actually modifying one or two functions (and having to supply
duplicate code for those functions which weren't modied). However with suitable tool
support this could be automated.
In [13] the authors build on [12] focusing particularly on implementation and compiler
tools but, whilst they present interesting motivational concepts behind [13], they provide
no new formal technical approaches and rely on dynamic type checking in dynamic
linking of veriable native code. The work in [20,36] is similar in providing case studies
and compiler tools.
The next development to the static analysis approach to DSU is [45]. The authors
present a C like language, including state, pointers and records (which can be use to
implement structures) and facilities to dynamically update code. The granularity of
update in this paper has changed from the module in [12] to the function - hence the
programmer can change the function body (and type signature) of any function and
the system will ensure that the updated code is still type safe. A single update can
still modify more than one function. This system also permits updates to modify an
abstract data type and hence the data items of the type being modied must also be
modied so that they conform to the new type. Hence in this system when modifying
an abstract data type the programmer must include a function to transform values from
the old type to the new type.
The analysis in [45] still includes a dynamic aspect as the system, upon reaching an
update command, it performs a dynamic check (using compile time type information)
to verify that the update is valid at that specic update point. It would be possible to,
at compile time, ensure that the update would be valid at every update point (a fully
static analysis) using the type system of [45]. Instead the very last check at runtime
so that if the update is valid at some update points but not at all the the update is
not rejected as unsafe. Hence, whilst being in part a dynamic analysis, it could equally
validly (and more conservatively) be constructed as a static analysis.
Implementation and compiler tool details for the work in [45] are provided in [39].
Together [39,45] provide a comprehensive technique for dynamically updating single-
threaded code with arbitrary changes to code, function denitions, type denitions and
state. Since the work in [45] permits arbitrary updates with few restrictions, subsequent
work on single-threaded DSU does not focus the generality of updates (increasing what
can be updated). In [38] the authors instead focus upon making updates easier for the
programmer to reason about.
10In [13,14,45] updates occur when a specic language primitive, the update command, is
encountered. These are written in the code by the programmer and, incorrectly placed,
could cause updates to occur in a manner which whilst type safe would violate the
constraints of how the programmer desires the system to behave. An example of such a
violation is as follows. Consider the program in Figure 2.1 and a type safe update update
changing the bodies of functions f(),g() from f1();g1() to f2();g2(). In an unrolling of
the main loop, the update is applied at the update command. This changes the system
so that the code executed when calling f() and g() is f2() and g2() respectively. One
eect of this is that after the update the function call to update_log() is no longer made
in f() but in g(). Hence, since in this loop unrolling we have called the old version of
g(), g1(), and we will call the new version of f(), f2(), update_log() is not called at
all in this loop unrolling.
In this example update_log() appends a new entry to the log, and we are assuming
the programmer expects a log entry to be written for each loop unrolling. As we showed
above, however, in the loop unrolling when we apply the update then there will be no
call to update_log(). Whilst we have not violated any type safety properties, since
the update is type safe, the programmer's conceptual constraint of update_log() being
called on each loop unrolling has been violated.
In [38] the authors present a DSU system whose main goal is to \[let] programmers
reason more easily about the safety of updates". To achieve this update commands
are no longer used, and they address the issue of when updates should occur using
transactional techniques from database research. In their language the programmer can
delineate regions of code inside which she does not wish an update to the code to (visibly)
occur. The authors include a safety property (transactional version consistency) so that
such a region of code will run entirely with old version code or entirely with new version
code. Consider again the above example, with the body of the loop delineated as such a
region. In the loop unrolling when the update occurs the old version of g() and the new
version of f() are called. Hence the above example does not have transactional version
consistency.
This analysis can be used to prevent errors of the type demonstrated in Figure 2.1. It is
also of use for detecting thread shared locations, and hence the words `Safe Concurrent
Programming' in the title. It is, however, only applicable to DSU for single-threaded
programs. The contribution to DSU is mainly one of a dierent method for the pro-
grammer to specify where updates should occur. The contribution's main motivation,
and the issue addressed, is usability and hence makes little advance to the theoretical
contribution to DSU. The work, however, is more liberal with respects to when and
where updates may occur. In DSU we often require synchronisation between threads to
perform an update. Hence each thread being less prescriptive about when and where an
update occurs may make it easier to nd a synchronisation point.
11In [37] the transactional approach to updating programs is used to extend simple typing
to MDSU. The authors make us of the key insight that, as they can automatically infer
regions where a modication will make the program run with either entirely with old
version code or entirely with new version code, whenever a set of threads are all in such
a region they can all apply an update without having to synchronise. We make use of
this technique when attempting to remove synchronisation requirements.
In [24] the authors move towards considering behavioural properties for multi-threaded
programs. Instead of proving formal properties or behaviours, however, the authors take
the industry standard approach of performing a set of tests on the program. The authors
develop an approach to automatically generate tests which will ensure that regression
tests which held before the update hold after it. If this were done naively, the number
of update tests generated would be infeasibly large. The authors present an approach
to signicantly reduce the number of tests required.
To date several practical, formal, static analyses have been developed for DSU [14,37,
38,45]. Using formal techniques they ensure several safety properties (primarily simple
type safety) are preserved across type boundaries. These analyses, particularly the work
in [37,45], provide a comprehensive and safe system for performing general updates which
preserve simple type safety. There are many standard concurrent behavioural properties,
however, which are not covered by simple typing. Hence we intend on addressing such
behaviours with additional analyses.
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Resource Access with Variably
Typed Return
3.1 Introduction
In real world systems we need to be able to obtain (and type-safely use) meaningful
values from shared resources, such as a message sent from another thread or a piece of
mobile code to execute. Most systems will require a runtime type check to guarantee an
obtained value is of the expected type.
Some static analyses take account of this problem, so that runtime checks are unnec-
essary. Work on general resource usage [31] eectively ignores the problem by making
impure accesses return a value with a constant type, such as unit or a boolean to indicate
whether the access was successful. Session typing analyses for message passing systems
statically guarantee that values received on channels are of the annotated, expected
type. These analyses are similar in concept, but each time any change is made to the
semantics of the code or the message passing the safety proofs must be redone, often in
radically dierent ways.
We extract and generalise the principle features of systems where resource accesses can
return dierent types, using message passing and session typing as a base (Section 3.2).
We proceed to similarly generalise the concepts used in session typing to prove type
safe accesses. We crucially separate the aspects of the safety proof which can be done
for general systems from those which are dependent on the semantics of accessing the
resources, referred to as the invariability proof (Section 3.3). Finally we give an example
of an invariability proof. We also discuss our intention to explore invariability proofs
for dierent semantics and show how it is easier to work with invariability proofs than
redoing proofs for each new system (Section 3.4).
13e ::= v
j recf=x:e
j ee
j snd(e;e)
j rcv(e)
v ::= n
j b
j ()
j c
j x
P ::= hei
j PkP
 ::= c7!q
j ;
q ::= v
j q;q
Figure 3.1: Message passing language
[]e1  ![0]e0
1
(RAppOne)
[]e1 e2  ![0]e0
1 e2
[]e2  ![0]e0
2
(RAppTwo)
[]v e2  ![0]v e0
2
(RAppThree)
[]recf=x:ev  ![]e[recf=x:e=f][v=x]
[]e1  ![0]e0
1
(RSnd1)
[]snd(e1;e2)  ![0]snd(e0
1;e2)
[]e2  ![0]e0
2
(RSnd2)
[]snd(v;e2)  ![0]snd(v;e0
2)
0=[c7!(c);v]
(RSnd3)
[]snd(c;v)  ![0]()
[]e  ![0]e0
(RRcv1)
[]rcv(e)  ![0]rcv(e0)
(c)=v;q 0=[c7!q]
(RRcv2)
[]rcv(c)  ![0]v
[]e  ![0]e0
(RProc)
[]hei  ![0]he0i
[]P1  ![0]P0
1
(RParOne)
[]P1kP2  ![0]P0
1kP2
[]P2  ![0]P0
2
(RParTwo)
[]P1kP2  ![0]P1kP0
2
Figure 3.2: Message passing language semantics
3.2 Semantics of Simplied Shared Resources Systems
We look rst at simplied message passing systems consisting of sending and receiving
values. It's easier to see the essence of the impure semantics in this system, and it's
easier to see what you need to prove to prove safety. After we've done that we look at
how more complex behaviours t in.
3.2.1 Semantics of Message Passing Systems
Message passing systems consist of shared channels where accesses to shared channels
can add and remove values from the channel queues. We dene a simplied message
passing language and its resources in Figure 3.1 and its semantics in Figure 3.2. The
pure aspects of the system are standard. The (impure) shared resources  are a set of
channel names c with associated queues q. Sending a value adds it to the end of a queue.
Receiving a value takes a value o the front of the queue, if it exists.
Conceptually the impure aspects of a system can be broken down into four constituent
parts: the structure of the shared resources, the accesses permitted on the resources,
14the mechanism by which we obtain return values when accessing resources, and the
semantics of how accesses modify the resources.
For message passing systems the structure of the shared resources is channels and their
associate channel queues, as in Figure 3.1. The permitted accesses to the resources are
sending a value v on a channel c, snd(c;v), and receiving a value from channel c, rcv(c).
The mechanism for obtaining return values when accessing resources are incorporated
in the RSend and RRecv rules. We can abstract the mechanism out of the individual rules
by dening a projection function on the channels which, for a receive, returns the value
at the front of the channel queue (and blocks if it doesn't exist), and, for a send, returns
a constant unit value:
(l)
def =
8
> <
> :
v (c)=v;q^l=rcv(c)
() l=snd(c;v)
We then simply redene the rules so that all resource accesses use this projection func-
tion:
0=[c7!(c);v]
(RSend')
[]snd(c;v)  ![0](snd(c;v))
(c)=v;q 0=[c7!q]
(RRecv')
[]rcv(c)  ![0](rcv(c))
The semantics of how accesses modify the resources is also written into the rules for
resource accesses. Again we can abstract this semantics away from the main semantics
of the language by dening a reduction relation:
0=[c7!(c);v]
(RSnd)

snd(c;v)           !0
(c)=v;q 0=[c7!q]
(RRcv)

rcv(c)       !0
and redening the RSend and RRecv rules:

snd(c;v)           !0
(RSend")
[]snd(c;v)  ![0](snd(c;v))

rcv(c)       !0
(RRecv")
[]rcv(c)  ![0](rcv(c))
3.2.2 Semantics of Our General System
In order to obtain a generalised system which can be instantiated with dierent shared
resources and semantics for accessing those resources we want to separate these impure
aspects from the core language and semantics. This means that we will not have to
redene the language each time we wish to, for example, add a new access primitive or
modify the semantics of an existing primitive.
The impure aspects of the system are encapsulated by the structure of the shared re-
sources, the accesses permitted on the resources, the mechanism by which we obtain
return values when accessing resources, and the semantics of how accesses modify the
resources. We have shown how we can abstract the mechanism for return values by
dening a projection function on the shared resources using the access we are perform-
ing, and also how we can abstract the semantics of primitives using a reduction relation
15[]e1  ![0]e0
1
(RAppOne)
[]e1 e2  ![0]e0
1 e2
[]e2  ![0]e0
2
(RAppTwo)
[]v e2  ![0]v e0
2
(RAppThree)
[]recf=x:ev  ![]e[recf=x:e=f][v=x]

l   !0
(RAcc)
[]accl  ![0](l)
[]e  ![0]e0
(RProc)
[]hei  ![0]he0i
[]P1  ![0]P0
1
(RParOne)
[]P1kP2  ![0]P0
1kP2
[]P2  ![0]P0
2
(RParTwo)
[]P1kP2  ![0]P1kP0
2
Figure 3.3: General Language Semantics
over resources and the performed access. We combine these into a single resource access
primitive accl (as in [31]) which performs the access l on the shared resources. Then all
other access commands are simply syntactic sugar:
snd(c;v)
def = accsend(c;v) rcv(c)
def = accrecv(c)
For the core system we use a multi-threaded higher order lambda-calculus with recursive
functions. The language expressions and threads are dened in Figure 3.4. The oper-
ational semantics are as dened in Figure 3.3. The pure semantics of the operational
semantics of this language are standard.
e ::= v
j recf=x:e
j ee
j accl
v ::= n
j b
j ()
j r
j x
l ::= (v1;:::;vn)
P ::= hei
j PkP
Figure 3.4: Expression, Label, and Program Thread Grammars
In our abstraction we permit arbitrarily dened shared resources . We permit arbi-
trary accesses l to the shared resources, and use a single accesses primitive accl. The
RAcc reduction modies the accompanying shared resources according to the resource
modication relation 
l   ! 0. We do not dene this reduction relation as the denition
will change depending on the system. Instead we place requirements on the resources
projection function and the resources reduction relation:
If 
l   ! 0 then (l) is dened:
(l) is always a value:
We refer to the projection (l) as a resource access. The rst property requires that if
we can perform a reduction using an eect label a resource access using that label is
dened. The second property requires that the expression returned by a resource access
is a value. We will discuss the signicance of this property in Section 3.3.2. The return
16value of the RAcc reduction is dened as the projection of the resources using the access
label.
In order to verify that a value returned from a shared resource access is used in a type
safe manner we need to know what the type of that value is. In some simple systems all
values returned by performing the same type of access on the same resource, e.g. receive
actions on the same channel, are of the same type. An example of such a system is one
which uses simply-typed communications channels, such as integer channels on which
only integers can be sent and received. In these systems we can, at a resource access
and without any global information, determine the type of the value returned and hence
can verify type safe usage using simple typing.
When values of dierent types can be returned by performing the same type of access
on the same resource it is more dicult to locally determine the return type. This often
occurs when the type of the value returned is dependent on the current state of the
shared resources, for example in a message passing system where sending and receiving
of values of any type on a channel is permissible.
In these systems type usage errors can occur when the value obtained from a resource
access is not of the expected type. For example, using the message passing system
dened in Section 3.2.1, the following code will cause an error:
[c 7! ;]snd(c;true) k (rcv(c) + 1)
! [c 7! true]() k (rcv(c) + 1)
! [c 7! ;]() k (true + 1)
9
(3.1)
Such systems are not, however, inherently awed. The existence of a type error is
dependent on the resource accesses, the impure semantics, and the starting state of the
resources. For example, with the same code and dierent starting resources no error
occurs:
[c 7! 2]snd(c;true) k (rcv(c) + 1)
! [c 7! 2;true]() k (rcv(c) + 1)
! [c 7! true]() k (2 + 1)
! [c 7! true]() k 3
(3.2)
In situations where we can determine the return type at the resource access without
knowledge of other threads' behaviour and the state of the resources we say that we can
determine the type locally. Otherwise we determine it globally.
17' ::= c!hTi
j c?(T)
j '; '
j 
 ::= '
j  k 
Figure 3.5: Eects for a simple session typing system
3.3 Proving Safe Access of Shared Resources
3.3.1 Type Safe Resource Usage for Message Passing Systems
Session typing analyses are a body of static analyses which have been designed to deter-
mine whether a program in a message passing system with untyped channels will have
any type errors due to the values sent and received on the channels. Conceptually they
do this as follows. They perform a type and eect analysis on the code, where the eect
is an abstraction of the communication behaviour. They assume some starting state of
the resources, usually channels with empty queues, or an empty state without channels
which are dynamically created. Then they dene some predicate over the eects which,
when true, in combination with their knowledge of the impure semantics of the system
and the starting state, can be proved to imply that no type errors occur.
We can do a sketch of such a system and proof. We dene the eects in Figure 3.5,
where c!hTi denotes sending a value of type T on channel c, and c?(T) denotes receiving
a value of type T on channel c. Note that instead of the eect label annotating the
specic value sent, as in previous sections, that the type of that value is annotated
instead. We assume some type and eect system which determines the eect for code in
the message passing language from Section 3.2.1, so that, for example, we can determine
that the code:
snd(c1;true); 4 + 5; snd(c2;true) k (rcv(c2) + 1) (3.3)
has the eect:
c1!hBooli; c2!hBooli k c2?(Int) (3.4)
where e1; e2 is syntactic sugar for recf = x:e2 e1 when x and f are free in e2. We
assume the resources start as:
 = c1 7! ;;c2 7! ;
We assume that at most two threads make use of a channel. Then we need to guar-
antee that the values sent are of the type which the receiver expects. To do this we
18compare the eects of the threads which use each channel, and require that each eect
is `complementary' to the other [28]. We dene the complementary predicate as follows:
compl('1;'2)
def =
8
> <
> :
true '1=c!hTi^'2=c?(T)_'1=c?(T)^'2=c!hTi
compl('0
1;'0
2)^compl('00
1;'00
2) '1='0
1;'00
1^'2='0
2;'00
2
This will then catch the error in eect (3.4), as the value sent is not of the type expected
by the receiver.
If we did not make the restriction that channels are only used by two threads then
the eects being complementary would not be a sucient condition to prevent errors.
Consider the following code and one of its possible evaluations:
Example 3.1.
[c 7! ;]snd(c;1); snd(c;true) k snd(c;2); snd(c;false) k rcv(c) + 1; :rcv(c)
! [c 7! 1]snd(c;true) k snd(c;2); snd(c;false) k rcv(c) + 1; :rcv(c)
! [c 7! 1;2]snd(c;true) k snd(c;false) k rcv(c) + 1; :rcv(c)
:::
! [c 7! 2]snd(c;true) k snd(c;false) k :rcv(c)
! [c 7! ;]snd(c;true) k snd(c;false) k :2
9
In this situation, each of the senders sends values of the type which the receiver is
expecting, but as there are multiple senders the sends can interleave resulting in a value
of an unexpected type being received.
If we made dierent assumptions about the state of the starting resources we would need
to ensure that, after receiving the messages already in the channel's queue, the eect of
the receiving thread, ignoring these receives, is complementary to the eect of the other
thread:
Example 3.2.
[c 7! 2]snd(c;true) k rcv(c) + 1; :rcv(c)
! [c 7! 2;true]() k rcv(c) + 1; :rcv(c)
:::
! [c 7! ;]() k :true
! [c 7! ;]() k false
Here the eect of the code is:
c!hBooli k c?(Int); c?(Bool) (3.5)
If we discard the prex c?(Int), which corresponds to receiving the integer value already
19in the queue, then the remaining eects c!hBooli and c?(Bool) are complementary, which
reects the safety of the code with the specied starting resources.
3.3.2 Type Safe Resource Usage in our General System
In Section 3.3.1 we demonstrate how, given assumptions about the semantics of message
passing systems, we can determine whether some code would safely use the resources.
We also discuss how the safety of code can depend on the starting state of the resources
and on the interleaving of accesses to the resources. In this section we will reduce our
assumptions, and show how to prove type safety in a way which takes note of the initial
resources and possible interleaving of accesses.
As in Section 3.2.2 we want to permit the structure of shared resource and the resource
reduction relation to be dened arbitrarily (whilst still retaining the reduction relation
properties stated). We require that the expression returned by the resource access is
actually a value. This is to guarantee that the thing returned cannot be evaluated with
an unspecied eect. If the value is a function then its eect is annotated on the type.
Hence when we guarantee that the type of the returned expression does not vary we also
guarantee that the eect of the function does not vary.
In general we cannot locally determine the type returned by a resource access; recall the
Code 3.1 where the type returned depends on the interleaving of other threads' actions.
Our novel approach is instead to infer locally the expected type of the value returned
using the context. We then delay ensuring that the value actually will be of that type
until we are typing threads in parallel with each other and we can reason about the
global, interleaving, behaviour. We annotate the expected type of a resource accesses
on the access itself; the code accl will have a simple type T and an eect (L;T). We
refer to the thread in which an access occurs as the containing thread.
We dene the type, eect, and label grammars in Fig 3.6. The eects are standard,
with the addition of annotating the expected type on the eect with the eect label.
Recursive eects are equi-recursive, i.e. t:'  '[t:'=t]. As the code is concurrent we
also dene concurrent eects as a small process algebra . We dene our type and eect
system in Figure 3.7. The rules for expressions are standard [40]; the eects abstract
the side eecting behaviour of the code. We use a standard type and eect judgement
' o   ` e: T which denotes that, given the type information  , the expression e has
simple type T, and the side eect of evaluating the expression is conservatively described
by the eect '.
The underlying assumption we made about the semantics in Section 3.3.1 is that the
values returned by receive accesses are the same values which were sent on the channel,
and that the rst value which was sent is the rst one received. This permits us to simply
look at the types of the values sent, and the order that they are sent in, and guarantee
20' ::= (L;T)
j '; '
j t:'
j 
 ::= '
j  k 
L ::= (T1;:::;Tn)
T ::= Bool
j Int
j Unit
j T
'
  ! T
Figure 3.6: Type and Eect Grammars
(:TInt)
; o   ` n: Int
(:TBool)
; o   ` b: Bool
(:TUnit)
; o   ` (): Unit
(:TRes)
; o   ` r: Resr
x: T 2  
(:TVar)
; o   ` x: T
  ` l: L
(:TAcc)
(L;T) o   ` accl: T
' o  ;x: T1;f : T1
'
  ! T2 ` e: T2
(:TLam)
; o   ` recf = x:e: T1
'
  ! T2
'1 o `e1: T1
'3   !T2 '2 o `e2: T1
(:TApp)
'1; '2; '3 o   ` e1 e2: T2
l = (v1;:::;vn) L = (T1;:::;Tn) ; o   ` vi: Ti
(:TLab)
  ` l: L
'i o ; ` ei: Ti
(:TPar)
` he1i k ::: k heni: '1 k ::: k 'n
` P :  :  compatible(;)
(:ValidThreads)
 ` P : 
where
compatible(;)
)compGen(;)
Figure 3.7: Type Rules for Expressions, Labels, and Threads
that the receives are all of the same type in the same order. Such an assumption makes
for reasonably easy proofs, but will obviously not always be true; we cannot necessarily
rely a simple FIFO semantics of values added to the shared resource when using, for
example, a distributed database.
3.3.2.1 Using types instead of values in eects
In the same vein as our approach to typing message passing we annotate the type of
the argument value on the eect label, rather than the value itself. This permits us to
perform arbitrary pure computation in the argument positions of access labels. If we did
not permit this then we could only permit non-variable values in argument positions,
which would be a sever restriction. As it is, we must introduce some minor additional
restrictions on the impure semantics, which conceptually will permit us to perform our
static analysis on an abstraction of the resources and their semantics rather than their
concrete counterparts.
In addition to the two requirements stated in Section 3.2.2 we also require a resources
abstraction , its reduction relation    ! 0, its projection function (L), and a way to
21relate the two : , which satisfy the following properties:
If 
l   ! 0 and :  then ; ` l: L and 
L   ! 0:
If :  and ; ` l: L then (l): (L):
3.3.2.2 Globally checking type safety
In order to guarantee type safety we need to verify that each resource access returns
a value of the expected type, which is annotated on the eect of that resource access,
irrespective of the previous accesses that have occurred. As the return type of a resource
access will depend on the state of the shared resources we must, in the general case,
explore all possible states that the shared resources can be in when a specic access is
reached, and guarantee that the value returned for each state is of the expected type.
Since we need to explore the state space of the resources, under the eect of the code,
the initial state of the resources is important as it is the state which we will reduce.
Informally, for each access (L;T) we require that, irrespective of the occurrence or
interleaving of other resource accesses which can occur before (L;T), the value returned
by access an access of type L is of type T. When typing a lone thread this simply consists
of considering how the resources are reduced using the eect of the thread before a given
access. When typing multiple threads in parallel we must consider all interleavings of
the eects on the state of the shared resources from parallel threads. If the type of a
given access is equal to the expected type for that access irrespective of the scheduling
of the resource accesses by threads in parallel or by the containing thread, up to the
point of the given access, we refer to the set of threads as compatible.
To state this property formally we dene a predicate compatibleGeneral (shortened to
compGen) and the auxiliary function interleavings (shortened to int). The interleavings
function provides all possible interleavings of a set of parallel eects. We also dene a
`sub-run' relation '2  '1 which denotes that '2 is a prex of one possible run of '1; at
this point it is simply a prex as an eect can only have one possible run, but when we
introduce choice the relation will become more complex due to dierent possible runs
for the same eect. The sub-run relation is the smallest relation dened over:
'0  '
'0  '; '  '
We dene 
'
  !
 0 as the reexive and transitive closure of 
(L;T)
      ! 0.
compGen('1;:::;'n;)
def = 8i21:::n;'0
1'1;:::;('0
i;(L;T))'i;:::;'0
n'n;
8'2int('0
1;:::;'0
n):if there is a reduction
path 
'   !
0 (L;T)       !00 then 0(L)=T
22int('1;:::;'n)
def =
Sn
i=1f(L;T);'0j'i=(L;T);'0
i^'02int('1;:::;'0
i;:::;'n;g)
The predicate compGen is a formalisation of model checking the possible interleavings of
the eects on the resources . It includes a check for the existence of a reduction path
as, depending on the resources reduction relation, we may not be able to perform all
eects in any order. For example in a blocking asynchronous message passing system we
cannot receive a message before it is sent. This approach has exponential complexity.
This is, however, the general solution where we know nothing about the structure of the
resources, the permissible accesses, and all we know about the resource reduction relation
are the two properties from Section 3.2.2. Given more information about the resources
reduction relation then we may be able to dene a predicate compatible (otherwise known
as an invariability predicate) such that:
compatible(;) ) compGen(;)
As this strengthened predicate implies general compatibility we can employ instead of
the general predicate, in situations where we can provide a proof of this implication. In
the ValidThreads rule we use this predicate instead of compatibleGeneral. The complexity
of this predicate will vary depending on the situation, but can be as low as linear
complexity. We refer to proving such an implication as an invariability proof. We give
examples of such proofs, and explore how they simplify the proof process, in Section 3.4.
3.3.3 More complex behaviours
Some of the strengths of message passing systems with session typing include permitting
variable sessions to occur, where one thread can determine which paths the other threads
take, and delegation, where one thread sends another thread a channel for it to transmit
on. In this section we explore these properties and how they interact with proving type
safe access.
3.3.3.1 Internal and external choice
In order to permit variable sessions message passing systems can include a pair of com-
plementary constructs which correspond to internal and external choice (often referred
to as selection and branching). Internal choice chei:e0 consists of sending the value that
e reduces to the dependent thread, via c, and then evaluating e0 which contains the code
for the chosen path. External choice c&(T1 ) e1;:::;Tn ) en) consists on performing
a case split on the type of the value received by the dependent thread, via c, where e1
contains the code for each possible path i. We extend the eects with c  hTi:'0 and
c&(T1 ) '1;:::;Tn ) 'n), which have a similar meaning.
23e ::= :::
j ifetheneelsee
j accl&(T1 ) e1;:::;Tn ) en)
T ::= :::
j T&T
' ::= :::
j '  '
j '&'
Figure 3.8: Extended expressions, types and eects
In message passing systems there is an obvious dependency between the values sent on a
channel and the values received from it, and hence between the access which is chooses
the path and the access which receives that choice. We can express this by extending
the `complementary' relation:
compl('1;'2)
def =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
:::
9i:T=Ti^compl('0;'0
i) '1=chTi:'0^'2=c&(T1)'0
1;:::;Tn)'0
n)_
'1=c&(T1)'0
1;:::;Tn)'0
n)^'2=chTi:'0
This denotes that two eects are complementary if one of them presents a series of
choices of paths to follow, the other chooses which path to follow, and the eect of the
option and the choice are complementary.
In general there is not necessarily a connection between one thread choosing a path
and other threads accepting that choice. We can, however, generalise the concept.
The generalisation of internal choice is simply the ifethene0 elsee00 construct, where
we permit e0 and e00 to have dierent eects. The generalisation of external choice is
similar to the construct in message passing systems. We dene a construct accl&(T1 )
e1;:::;Tn ) en) which denotes that the containing thread will perform an access l and
will perform a case split on the type of the value returned.
As we now permit a specic resource access to return dierent types to be valid, we
need to extend our denitions of types and our denition of compatibility. We extend
the types with external choice which denotes a union type. Our extensions are dened
in Figure 3.8. We then provide additional reduction rules and type rules for the new
constructs in Figure 3.9.
We dene a type inclusion relation as the smallest reexive, transitive relation dened
over the rules:
T  T
T  T0
T  T0&T00
T  T00
T  T0&T00
This relation denotes that a type is included in a union type constructed using that
type.
When there is a choice, either internal or external, about the possible eect of some
code then we can obtain dierent runs for the same single-threaded eect. We hence
24[]e1  ![0]e0
1
(RIfOne)
[]ife1 thene2 elsee3  ![0]ife0
1 thene2 elsee3
(RIfTwo)
[]iftruethene2 elsee3  ![]e2
(RIfThree)
[]iffalsethene2 elsee3  ![]e3

l   !0 (l): Ti
(RExtChoice)
[]accl&(T1)e1;:::;Tn)en)  ![0]ei
'1 o   ` e1: Bool '2 o `e2: T '3 o `e3: T
(:TIfExpr)
'1; ('2  '3) o   ` ife1 thene2 elsee3: T
'i o   ` ei: T   ` l: L
(:tExtChoice)
(L;T1); '1&:::&(L;Tn); 'n o   ` accl&(T1 ) e1;:::;Tn ) en): T
Figure 3.9: Extended operational semantics and type rules
also extend the sub-run relation with the following:
'0
1  '1
'0
1  '1&'2
'0
2  '2
'0
2  '1&'2
'0
1  '1
'0
1  '1  '2
'0
2  '2
'0
2  '1  '2
Finally we make a small modication to the general compatibility relation, to dene an
acceptable return type as one which is included in the expected type:
compGen('1;:::;'n;)
def = 8i21:::n;'0
1'1;:::;('0
i;(L;T))'i;:::;'0
n'n;
8'2int('0
1;:::;'0
n):if there is a reduction
path 
'   !
0 (L;T)       !00 then 0(L)T
With these extensions we can represent eects which are dependent on the values re-
turned from resource accesses, and still guarantee type safe usage of values obtained
from resource accesses.
3.3.3.2 Delegation
In order to permit one thread to control the impure behaviour of another some message
passing systems include functionality called delegation, where one thread sends a channel
to another, for the latter to use normally. In future work we intend to include dynamic
resources (which are used in Section 4.3, based on [7]). Once we permit dynamic resource
values to be sent over the shared resources, and dynamic resources are nominally typed,
and as we require for the values received from a specic resource access to be of the same
type, we eectively get delegation for free, as we statically determine the types received
by resource accesses.
25(:ESkip)
'
   ! '
(:EAcc)
(L;T); '
(L;T)
      ! '
i 2 1;2
(:EIntChoice)
'1  '2
   ! 'i
'i     ! '0
ii 2 1;2
(:EExtChoice)
'1&'2
(L;T)
      ! '0
i
1
(L;T)
      ! 0
1
(:EParOne)
1 k 2
(L;T)
      ! 0
1 k 2
2
(L;T)
      ! 0
2
(:EParTwo)
1 k 2
(L;T)
      ! 1 k 0
2
Figure 3.10: Eect Reduction Rules
3.3.4 Properties
We present the main properties of the general system, which are subject reduction and
delity.
3.3.4.1 Subject Reduction
Informally, subject reduction states that any reduction preserves or decreases the type
and eect of an expression [33]. We formalise reduction validity for eects as the smallest
transitive relation dened over the rules in Figure 3.10.
This relation denotes which reductions on eects are valid. Most of the denitions are
straightforward. ESkip describes reductions which don't perform resource accesses and
don't perform dynamic modications. EAcc describes reductions which perform resource
accesses. EIntOne, EIntTwo, EextOne, and EExtTwo describe choosing one possible path
and following it. EParOne and EParOne describe how the eects of parallel threads may
change.
Theorem 3.1. Subject Reduction
If ` P :  and []P   ! [0]P0 then ` P0: 0 and    ! 0
We provide a sketch proof of subject reduction as follows. We prove subject reduction
by induction over the operational semantics. The most important case for guaranteeing
type safety, specically that the types of resource accesses are equal to the expected types
irrespective of how the resources may be dynamically modied, is the parallel reduction
case. Given a well typed set of parallel threads, by the compatibility property we know
that the expected types are invariant irrespective of the scheduling of their eects. This
is veried by performing model checking, or some predicate which, given additional
information about the semantics of the resources, implies compatibility. Hence any
reductions will not invalidate this property.
263.3.4.2 Fidelity
We also prove the soundness of the eect analysis. In the delity theorem we guarantee
that the actual reductions on the resources are matched by reductions on the abstraction,
that such reductions can only occur if they are expected in the eect, and that the
modied resources stay consistent with the abstraction. This is a generalisation of the
delity property for session typing systems [29]. To prove this property we dene a
reduction relation using the rules in Figure 3.10 on resources and parallel eects which
denotes how an eect modies the resources:

'   !0 
'   !0
(EffectRed)
[]
'   ![0]0
Theorem 3.2. Fidelity
If ` P :  and []P
'
  ! [0]P0 then []
'
  ! [0]0
3.4 Exploring Invariability Proofs
In future work we intend to explore invariability proofs for dierent semantics and show
how it is easier to work with them as opposed to redoing proofs for each new system. We
intend on contrasting the semantics for blocking message passing systems, non-blocking
message passing systems, and `dynamically typed' stores. In this report we simply give
the example of blocking message passing systems.
3.4.1 Examples
3.4.1.1 Blocking Message Passing Systems
We make use of the eect grammar of Figure 3.5:
' ::= c!hTi
j c?(T)
j '; '
j 
 ::= '
j  k 
and the resource denition and semantics from Section 3.2.1, modied to work on types:
(L)
def =
8
> <
> :
T (c)=T;q^L=c?( )
() L=c!hTi
0=[c7!(c);T]
(TRSnd)

c!hTi       !0
(c)=T;q 0=[c7!q]
(TRRcv)

c?( )       !0
27
c!hTi       !0
(RSend")
[]c!hTi  ![0](c!hTi)

c?(T)       !0
(RRecv")
[]c?(T)  ![0](c?(T))
In order to make an invariability proof, we make use of the essence of session typing work:
complementary eects [27]. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, this assumes that only two
threads make use of a channel, and the eect of each on the channel is complementary
to the eect of the other on the channel. We make use of the following formalisations:
threadsUsing singles out the threads which use a particular channel, eectOn extracts the
behaviour on one specic channel, and compl denes if two eects are complementary.
threadsUsing(;c)
def =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
; c= 2'^='
' c2'^='
threadsUsing(1;c)[threadsUsing(2;c) =1k2
eectOn(';c)
def =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
' '=c!h i_'=c?( )
 '=c0!h i_'=c0?( )_'=
eectOn('1;c);eectOn('2;c) '='1;'2
compl('1;'2)
def =
8
> <
> :
true '1=c!hTi^'2=c?(T)_'1=c?(T)^'2=c!hTi
compl('0
1;'0
2)^compl('00
1;'00
2) '1='0
1;'00
1^'2='0
2;'00
2
We can then dene an invariability predicate for the blocking message passing system:
compatible(;)
def = 8c2:threadsUsing(;c)=f'1;'2g^compl(eectOn('1;c);eectOn('2;c))
Proving that this implies general compatibility is then simple. If the predicate is true,
only two threads are using a shared resource. As their eects are complementary each
send appends to the end of the message queue the type expected by the receiver. As
the receiver blocks on a receive action when the queue is empty, the value received will
always be of the correct type.
3.5 Conclusions
We show how obtaining values of the correct type from shared resource is a signicant
behavioural property for multi-threaded programs. We generalise the approach taken
in session typing and discuss how in general, to prove safety, we need to perform some
form of model checking. We discuss how, given more knowledge about a system, we
can use predicates which are linear in eect size rather than model checking which is
exponential. We present one such predicate and suggest future work comparing it with
predicates for other systems, positing that dening such predicates and proving that
they imply the general property is simpler than repeatedly doing session typing style
proofs for each dierent system.
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Access Policies
4.1 Introduction
Both for program correctness and for security, it is essential that a program access re-
sources in a valid manner. Validity of access may comprise guaranteeing that threads
communicate according to a certain protocol, that code cannot access data sets of com-
panies between which there is a conict of interest, or that denial of service attacks
cannot occur. Any time that we are interested in how data is used, moved, or viewed,
we can consider it a resource, alongside traditional resources such as mutexes and net-
work ports.
Many techniques have been developed in order to dene and control how resources are
used. We employ local usage automata to specify what sequences of resource accesses
are invalid. Local usage automata formalise and enhance the concept of a sandbox.
These automata are designed so that policies only specify the behaviour which we are
interested in; other resource accesses are assumed to be on self loops within the automata.
This approach is more exible than global policies or explicit local checks in program
code. Due to the local nature of the policies dierent pieces of code with dierent usage
requirements can easily be composed. They also are designed so that policies can be
applied to code which has been obtained from remote or untrusted sources. Finally
these policies are parametric and do not have to be dened solely on statically known
resources.
Whilst proving security and behavioural properties is important for single-threaded pro-
grams, it is arguably even more important for concurrent programs, where interleaving
of accesses can lead to unforseen interactions. Previous work on policy automata has
been limited to single-threaded programs. Whilst the authors of prior work on policy
automata suggest that extending policy automata to concurrent programs would be
simple, using BPPs [7], recent work shows this to be impossible [30].
29Instead, we provide an intuitive extension of the calculus of usages presented in [7]
(hereafter referred to as single-threaded usages) to include concurrency (hereafter re-
ferred to as concurrent usages). When model checking policy automata we check that
the possible traces which a concurrent usage can generate respect the usage policies.
In order to generate the approach for concurrent usages we make use of the insight
that if some single-threaded usage is trace equivalent to some concurrent usage then the
concurrent usage is safe if and only if the single-threaded usage is safe with respects
to some automata. We show how extract a trace equivalent single-threaded usage for
any concurrent usage. We prove this extraction process to be well dened and nite,
for the nite systems that we are considering. We can then use existing model check-
ing infrastructure [7] to ensure that the concurrent usage adheres to the desired access
policies.
One of the issues when model checking concurrent programs is the that the state-space
is exponential size with respects to the single-threaded usages which are in parallel.
In order to reduce the space we make use of the fact that many concurrent systems
include actions which can be blocked, depending on the state of shared resources. If an
action is blocked then we can ignore an interleaving trace that we are model checking
from that point onwards, as it will not occur at runtime. We further reduce the cost of
model checking by making use of policy automata which simulate the semantics of the
blockable resources, which means that we needn't run a model of the resources alongside
the model checker in order to discover when a trace becomes blocked.
Our contribution is the following. We dene a projection function which, for any con-
current usage, gives a trace-equivalent single-threaded usage Crucially, we prove that
this projection is both well dened and nite. We use this projection function to extend
model checking of local policy automata to concurrent systems. We show how to im-
prove the eciency and accuracy of this model checking process by eliminating traces
which will not occur at run-time, using information about the semantics of the impure
shared resources. This approach, naively, requires us to run a model of the semantics
alongside the model checker. We show how to reduce this cost by simulating the impure
semantics in the policy automata.
This paper is structured as follows. We summarise related work in Section 4.2. We de-
scribe the local usage policy approach for single-threaded programs [3,6,7] in Section 4.3.
We extend access policies to multi-threaded systems in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we
present a technique to reduce the model checking state-space by only model checking in-
terleavings until the point that they would blocked at runtime by the resource semantics.
We conclude in Section 4.6.
304.2 Related Work
In [32] the authors present a type system for ensuring that resources are accessed accord-
ing to predened patterns. This is a formulaically elegant and general analysis which
could be used in many diverse situations. Hypothetically the analysis in [32], slightly
modied to ensure complementary actions between roles, could be used as a session
typing system. The analysis in [32] could also probably be used to control and validate
shared memory access. This work, however, only considers single-threaded functional
programs, and only permits specifying policies on single resources.
There is signicant work on validating correct use of resources with respect to local
automata policies [3,5{7]. This work permits policies to be specied with respects to
multiple resources, which can be both static or dynamic (created at runtime). In [5]
the authors present the concept of local policies, which only take account of specic
actions on specic resources - all other actions are ignored. This approach allows a
policy designer to focus on the property they are interested rather than the global state
of available resources, as previous approaches have done [8]. In [3, 6, 7] the authors
present a methodology for eciently model checking the policies against the actions of a
program. Of particular note is their approach of transforming resource usages into Basic
Process Algebras and using a weakened form of model checking to make their approach
complete as well as sound. The authors posit that their approach could be simply
extended to multi-threaded programs by transforming into Basic Parallel Processes [18]
rather than BPAs [7]. Recent work in equivalence decidability [30], however, shows
that trace equivalence, on which their approach is based, is undecidable for BPPs. We
instead look at representing the behaviour of multi-threaded programs as the behaviour
of single-threaded programs, which can be transformed to BPAs as in [7].
Extensive research exists on usage policies and their enforcement mechanisms which are
not relevant here. For a fuller review of the area see [3].
4.3 Access Policies for Single-Threaded Programs
We present existing work on access policies from single-threaded programs. This is a
summary of [3,5{7] with very minor modications to aid our approach. Access policies
act on events (T), where  is the event name (such as `lock' or `read') and T denotes
the type of the data used by the event. We sometimes use a label L to denote an event.
We make use of a basic calculus for usages, which can be computed for actual program
code using a type and eect system [40]. We dene this calculus in Figure 4.1.
Usages are history expressions. Actions, recursions, sequencing, and internal and exter-
nal choice are straightforward. Name binding x:U is a binder on the occurrences of the
31U ::= 
j (T)
j h
j U;U
j U + U
j x:U
j h:U
j '[U]
T ::= Bool
j Int
j Resx
j Resr
j T   ! T
Figure 4.1: Usage and Type Grammars
name x in U in order to keep track of the binding between x and a freshly created re-
source. We use '[U] as a sandboxing construct which denotes that the policy ' must be
respected during the execution of U. The '[U] construct is syntactic sugar for [';U;]'.
Note that when checking a policy we examine the trace before the start of the policy
and require that it, combined with the usage inside the policy, to be valid with respects
to the policy. This is called a history based approach.
Types include special nominal types: Resr denotes a resource r, and Resx denotes a
dynamic resource variable x which has yet to be instantiated; we use nominal types
to prevent aliasing. As events which act on multiple resources can be encoded using
events which act on single resources [3] we abuse notation and use polyadic events such
as `write(Resz; Int)'. A trace is a nite sequence of events, typically denoted by .
We dene usage policies, which dene some regular property, e.g. properly opening and
closing a le:
Example 4.1.
///.-, ()*+
open(f)
&&
read(f)
$$
GFED @ABC s1
close(f)
bb
GFED @ABC s2
where s1 and s2 are sink states. We assume that a sink state is one in which it would
be erroneous to end; it is acceptable to open a le, read it, then close it, but failing to
close the le is incorrect. Intuitively we would include a read self loop on s1 to indicate
that reading is permissible in this state, along with self loops for all actions on s2; we
omit these as self loops will be automatically added later.
Formally, a usage policy '(x) is a 5-tuple hB;Q;q0;F;Ei, where B is the input alphabet
(a set of events) which includes Resx and Resx, Q is a nite set of states, q0 is the
starting state, F is the set of nal (oending) states, and E is a nite set of edges.
Finally, x is the variable in which the usage policy is parametric - it can be instantiated
with any resource which is created at runtime (any dynamic resource). Edges in a usage
policy can be of three kinds: either (T) for a static type T (which includes static
32resources), or (Resx) for the parametric variable resource, or (Resx) for any other
dynamic resource besides Resx. We also make use of the syntactic sugar Res to denote
any resource and  to denote any type.
Given a resource Resr, a set of resources R, and a set of event names Events, a usage
policy '(x) is instantiated into a policy automaton A'(r;R) by binding x to the resource
Resr and making Resx range over fResr0jr0 2 Rnrg. Additionally we add self loops for
all events in the alphabet which we're not interested in, formally:
Denition 4.1. Usage Policies
A'(r;R) = hB0;Q;q0;F;E00i
where
B0 = f(T)j 2 Events ^ T 2 Rg
E0 = fq
(Resr)
          ! q0jq
(Resx)
          ! q0 2 Eg[ instantiation of x
S
r02(R[f?g)nrfq
(Resr0)
          ! q0jq
(Resx)
          ! q0 2 Eg[ instantiation of x
fq
(T)
      ! q0jq
(T)
      ! q0 2 E ^ T 6= Resx;Resxg static resources
E00 = E0 [ fq
(T)
      ! q0j@q
(T)
      ! q0 2 E0g self loops
Unknown resources [7] are wild cards allow slightly more complex properties to be
checked. Our formulation here leaves out unknown resources for the sake of simplic-
ity, but is capable of dealing with them in a way which is consistent with the underlying
model checking in [7] which we make use of.
In a world where the only actions were open, read, and write, and the only resource is
f, this closure would result in a FSA similar to:
close(f)
 ///.-, ()*+
open(f)
((
read(f)
$$
?>=< 89:; s
close(f)
hh
read(f)
open(f) ee
?>=< 89:; s
open(f)
close(f)
read(f)
ee
We dene that when a trace respects all the relevant usage policies it is valid. In order
to dene this formally we include several auxiliary concepts. We consider making a
trace  frameless unbox(), which means removing all policy frames [';]' from . We
also consider active policies within a trace; conceptually active policies are those which
we are currently enforcing. An active policy ' is one for which there is an opening
33(URAction)
(T);R
(T)       !;R
r2ResdnR
(URNewName)
x:U;R
   !U[r=x];R[frg
(URSeqEmpt)
;U;R
   !U;R
U1;R
   !U0
1;R0
(URSeq)
U1;U2;R
   !U0
1;U2;R0
i21;2
(URIntChoice)
U1+U2;R
   !Ui;R0
i21;2
(URExtChoice)
U1&U2;R
   !Ui;R0
(URRecDef)
h:U;R
   !U[h:U=h];R
Figure 4.2: Usage Reduction Semantics
frame [' for that policy within the trace, but there is no corresponding closing frame ]'.
The multiset act denotes the active policies of a trace. A trace 0 is a sub trace of  if
 = 0; 00. We then dene a trace as valid if at no point in the trace do we contrevene
any policy. Formally:
Denition 4.2. Frameless Traces, Active Policies, and Valid Trace Denitions
unbox()
def =
8
> <
> :
  = (T)
  = ['_ =]'
unbox(1);unbox(2)  = 1; 2
act()
def =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
;  = 
act(0)  = 0;(T)
act(0) [ f'g  = 0;['
act(0) n f'g  = 0;]'
 
  8' 2 act(;L): unbox(;L)  '
 ;L
where   ' when  is not included in the language dened by the automaton dened
by '. Conceptually a trace is valid when all sub traces respect the active policies within
those sub traces.
The traces which can be obtained from a usage U are dened to be those which can be
obtained by reducing the usage U;R

  !
 U0;R0 using the rules in Figure 4.2. A usage U
is valid when, for all U0;R;R0;;(U;R

  ! U0;R0) we have  .
In order to check whether a trace respects (is valid with respects to) a policy we would
have to instantiate innitely many automaton, each of which would have innitely many
edges (though a nite number of states). However, using an approach demonstrated in [7]
this can be decided through a nite set of nite state automata. The approach in [7]
contains additional technicalities; as we can plug the results of our contribution directly
into their infrastructure we do not go into these technicalities in detail.
344.4 Access Policies for Multi-Threaded Programs
Extending usages for single-threaded programs (Denition 4.1) to concurrent usages
for multi-threaded programs (Denition 4.3) is straightforward. We permit resource
creation to span over concurrent usages, and permit concurrent usages to be put in
parallel with each other.
Denition 4.3. Parallel Usages Grammar
P ::= U
j x:P
j PkP
In [7] the authors posit that their approach (outlined in Section 4.3) could be simply
extended to multi-threaded programs by using concurrent usages and transforming them
into Basic Parallel Processes rather than BPAs. Recent work in equivalence decidabil-
ity [30], however, shows that trace equivalence, on which their approach is based, is
undecidable for BPPs.
Instead, our approach is to look at representing the behaviour of multi-threaded pro-
grams as the behaviour of single-threaded programs. If we can transform a concurrent
usage into a single-threaded usage which is trace equivalent to the concurrent usage,
then we can model check this single-threaded usage as in [7].
4.4.1 Projecting Multi-Threaded Usages onto Single-Threaded Usages
Projecting concurrent usages onto single-threaded usages is straightforward if the con-
current usage is either a single-threaded usage or a dynamic resource creation construct.
In order to explain how we project two usages in parallel to a trace equivalent single-
threaded usage we illustrate with the following example. Consider the concurrent usage
1;2k3;4. When identifying the possible traces which can occur from this usage, we
can either choose for action 1 to occur rst, or for action 3 to go rst. In order to
reect both possible traces we must insert a non-deterministic choice between the two.
Conceptually, the result of running trace on this example would be:
trace(1;2k3;4) = 1;trace(2k3;4) + 3;trace(1;2k4)
Eect systems often use constraints in order to generate the eects [40]. When detecting
and modelling recursion explicitly we obtain constraints such as:
U = (T); U
35Exp(P; )
def =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
U P = U ^ @h: (h) = P
x:Exp(P0; ) P = x:P0 ^ @h: (h) = P
next(Exp(P1; );;P2; )+ P = P1kP2 ^ @h: (h) = P
next(Exp(P2; );;P1; )
h 9h: (h) = P
next(U;U0;P; )
def =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Exp(PkU0; ) U = 
(T);Exp(PkU0; ) U = (T)
next(U;U2;U0;P; ) U = U1;U2
next(U1;U0;P; )+ U = U1 + U2
next(U2;U0;P; )
x:next(U00;U0;P; ) U = x:U00
h0:next(U000;U0;P; 0) U = h:U00^
@h0: (h0) = U;U0kP
h00 free in  ^
U000 = U00[U=h]^
 0 =  [h00 7! PkU;U0]
h U = h:U00^
9h: (h) = U;U0kP
Figure 4.3: Trace Projection of Multi-Threaded Usages
This is the eect of a recursive function such as:
fx:acc(x); f x
where acc(x) is a construct which performs action (x). When we obtain such a
constraint we resolve it using a recursive denition such as:
U = h:((T);h)
We use a similar technique in our trace denition. The approach is more complicated,
however, as we have to deal with recursion under the parallel operator. Conceptually
what we do is the following:
Exp(h:(L1;h)kh0:(L2;h0))
= Exp(P1kP2)
= next(Exp(P1);;P2) + next(Exp(P2);;P1)
= next(P1;;P2) + next(P2;;P1)
= next(L1;P1;;P2) + next(L2;P2;;P1)
= next(L1;P1;P2) + next(L2;P2;P1)
= L1;Exp(P1kP2) + L2;Exp(P2kP1)
This should end up with a trace equivalent projection such as h:(L1 + L2);h. In order
to be able to constructively generate such projections we maintain a record of what
contexts we have seen a recursive denition in, using   and ; a context consists of
36the eect sequentially following the denition within that single-threaded eect, and the
concurrent eects which are in parallel. We separate these denitions in order to aid the
proof that this technique is well dened and nite. For more details see Section 4.4.3.
We formally dene the projection functions in Figure 4.3. In the Exp(P; ) function
we use   (referred to as the created recursive denitions) to keep track of the contexts
in which we have seen recursive denitions, where a context is the usage sequentially
following the recursive denition together with the concurrent usage it is in parallel with.
4.4.2 Possible Traces of Parallel Usages
In order to check trace equivalence we need to know what possible traces a usage or a
concurrent usage can perform. This is straightforward for single-threaded usages:
Denition 4.4. Interleavings of Single Threaded Usages
Traces(U)
def = fjU;;

  ! U0;R0g
using the reduction semantics dened in Figure 4.2. In order to extend this approach
to concurrent usages we must extend the reduction semantics to include the following
rules:
r2ResdnR
(URParNewName)
x:P;R
   !P[r=x];R[frg
P1;R
   !P0
1;R0
(URParOne)
P1kP2;R
   !P0
1kP2;R0
P2;R
   !P0
2;R0
(URParTwo)
P1kP2;R
   !P1kP0
2;R0
Then we can dene:
Denition 4.5. Interleavings of Concurrent Usages
Traces(P)
def = fjP;;

  ! P0;R0g
4.4.3 Trace Equivalence of Multi-Threaded Usages and Their Projec-
tions
In order to show trace equivalence we must rst show that the trace function is nite and
well dened. We do this by transforming the function into a tableau form. We include
some representative tableau rules in Figure 4.4. We make use of standard equivalence
rules for parallel processes.
Theorem 4.6. Each trace tableau is nite.
37@h: (h)  U
(:TUsage)
U ` Exp(U;; )
9h: (h)  P
(:TParTerm)
h ` Exp(P;; )
@h: (h)P1kP2 U1`Exp(P1;; ) U2`Exp(P2;; )
U0
1`next(U1;;;P2;; ;;) U0
2`next(U2;;;P1;; ;;)
(:TPar)
U0
1 + U0
2 ` Exp(P1kP2;; )
U ` Exp(PkU0;;( ;))
(:TAction)
(T);U ` next((T);U0;P;; ;)
U ` next(U00;U0;P;[h 7! h:U00]; ;[h0 7! Pkh:U00;U0]) h0 free in ; ;
(:TRecDef)
h0:U ` next(h:U00;U0;P;; ;)
Figure 4.4: Representative Tableau Rules
We make use of a proof method based on [47] which shows that there cannot be an
innite path through the tableau. An innite path could only occur from the recursive
denitions, but as each time we encounter a recursive denition in parallel with a con-
current usage we record it, in association with a fresh recursive variable (e.g. in TRecDef,
Figure 4.4). As this is a nite system we will eventually encounter the same recursive
denition in parallel with the same concurrent usage, and we can terminate returning
the previously created recursive variable.
Having proved well denedness and niteness of the tableau methods we can then prove
trace equivalence of the projection of a concurrent usage onto a single-threaded usage.
Theorem 4.7. Traces(P; ) = Traces(Exp(P; ); )
We prove this by simulataneous lexicographic induction over ( ;P) for int and trace,
where:
( ;P) < ( 0;P0)
def = (  =  0; 00) _   =  0 ^ P < P0
This induction is straightforward apart from in the case where P = P1kP2 and Exp(P1; ) 
h:U0. We extend   when we come across a recursive denition in a new context. If we
have not seen the denition in this context we increase the context set   and make use
of the fact that trace with a larger   are lexographically smaller. If we have seen this
denition in this context before we simply return the recursive variable that represents
the eect of the denition in this context. As we are working with a nite state system
the number of possible contexts is bounded, and hence we can perform induction over
increasing  .
38a start
b
c
lock(Resx;Resm)
write(Resx;Resz; )
read(Resx;Resz)
unlock(Resx;Resm)
write(Resx;Resz; )
read(Resx;Resz)
Figure 4.5: Mutex Policy Automata
4.5 Model Checking Access Policies
Once we have converted a concurrent usage into a trace equivalent single-threaded us-
age we can model check it using the approach from [7]. If we naively use this approach
(Section 4.5.1) the complexity is exponential in the number of parallel branches [34].
We can reduce the possible interleavings which we have to model check by taking ac-
count of the dynamic semantics of the accompanying resources (Section 4.5.2). That
approach, however, requires us to evaluate the resources along with the model checking.
As an alternative we present the novel approach of permitting access policies to ignore
certain interleavings, as long as they simulate the resource semantics (Section 4.5.3).
This ensures that model checking using access policies to decide which traces to ignore
conservatively approximates model checking using the resources and their semantics to
decide which traces to ignore.
4.5.1 Naive Model Checking
Consider the following concurrent usage:
Example 4.2.
lock(Resi;Resm);write(Resi;Resz; Int);unlock(Resi;Resm)k
lock(Resj;Resm);write(Resj;Resz; Int);unlock(Resj;Resm)
= L1;L2;L3kL4;L5;L6
where i;j are thread identiers to indicate which thread is performing the action, m is a
mutex name, and z is a shared variable name. We may wish to model check this usage
against a standard mutex policy, as dened in Figure 4.5. where s is the sink, and we
would instantiate Resx as Resi and Resj.
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lock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
unlock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
Figure 4.6: Instantiated Mutex Policy Automata
If we naively interleave the concurrent usages, we get 16 possible traces:
L1;L2;L3;L4;L5;L6
L4;L1;L2;L3;L4;L5
:::
L4;L1;L5;L6;L2;L3
L4;L5;L6;L1;L2;L3
In a naive model checking scenario we would check to ensure that each possible inter-
leaving does not end in the sink state. Obviously an interleaving such as:
lock(Resi;Resm);L4;write(Resj;Resz; Int);L6;L2;L3
would invalidate the automata above (Figure 4.5) instantiated with identier i (Figure
4.6). Hence the usage in Example 4.2 would be considered unsafe with respects to the
automata in Example 4.5, despite the fact that the usage is clearly a safe use of the
shared variable and its mutex, under standard semantics for locking and unlocking. In
order to get a more ne-grained analysis we must take account of these semantics.
4.5.2 Model Checking Using Resources
Whilst there are 16 possible naive interleavings of Example 4.2, only two of them can
actually occur in a system with standard semantics for locking and unlocking of mutexes.
These interleavings are as follows:
L1;L2;L3;L4;L5;L6 L4;L5;L6;L1;L2;L3
These represent either the rst thread goes rst and runs to completion and is followed
by the second thread, or vice-versa.
40Conceptually we need only model check traces of a usage until it becomes blocked; any
infractions of the policy after the point which a trace becomes stuck will never occur
in practice. In order to determine when a trace becomes blocked we need an abstract
model of the resources and their semantics to run the trace on. For our running example
the resources and the semantics of those resources are dened in Figure 4.7, where
Resm7!locked(Resi) denotes that mutext m is locked by thread i and Resz7!T denotes that
variable z contains a value of type T. The semantics denotes how an performing an
action L on the resources modies those resources.
Formally the set of traces of the longest possible subtraces of the interleavings before
blocking occurs, for resources  and resource semantics    ! 0, is dened as:
Denition 4.8. O(U)
def = f0j 2 U ^ 0 is the largest prex of  s.t. init
0
  !
g
where init represents the starting state of resources, init
0
  !
 0 is the transitive closure
of the semantics, and  2 U if
9R;R0;U0:(U;R

  ! U0;R0)
In our example the starting state of resources may be a mapping of shared variables to
default value types and mutexes to unlocked.
Whilst in this small example we can easily reduce the traces using the resource semantics
to nd the largest prex, in a larger, real-world system the cost in terms of time or space
to model check using the resources may be unreasonable.
4.5.3 Model Checking Using Simulating Automata
In order to reduce the computational requirements of model checking access policies we
want to nd a way to eliminate or reduce the usage of the resource semantics in the
model checking, as running this in parallel with the model checking adds continuous
 ::= Resm7!unlocked
j Resm7!locked(Resi)
j Resz7!T
j ;

read(Resz)
              ! 
0 = [Resz 7! T]

write(Resz;T)
                  ! 0
(Resm) = unlocked 0 = [Resm 7! locked(Resi)]

lock(Resi;Resm)
                    ! 0
(Resm) = locked(Resi) 0 = [Resm 7! unlocked]

unlock(Resi;Resm)
                        ! 0
Figure 4.7: Resource Denitions and Semantics
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lock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
unlock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
lock(Resi;Resm)
Figure 4.8: Refusal Policy for Mutex Usage
runtime overhead. In order to do this we introduce a modied form of access policies
called refusal policies (these are dened by the programmer similarly to usage policies
in [7]). Refusal policies include dotted arrows (a refusal arrow) which indicates that
a transition which we deem impossible to occur from the arrow's starting state. This
means that, when we generate the usage automaton from the model, we do not add self
loops for that action on that state. An example refusal policy is shown in Figure 4.8.
Formally, a refusal usage policy '(x) is a 6-tuple hB;Q;q0;F;E;Di, where B, Q, q0,
F, and E are as in Denition 4.1. The placeholder D denotes the refusal edges q 6
L   !,
the transitions which are deemed to be impossible to occur at runtime for a given state.
The refusal policy in Figure 4.8 would have D = fb 6
lock(Resi;Resm)
                    !g.
Given a refusal usage policy hB;Q;q0;F;E;Di we can instantiate it into an access policy
automaton, which has the same form as before:
Denition 4.9. Refusal Usage Policies
A'(r;R) = hB0;Q;q0;F;E00i
where
B0 = f(T)j 2 Events ^ T 2 Rg
E0 = fq
(Resr)
          ! q0jq
(Resx)
          ! q0 2 Eg[ instantiation of x
S
r02(R[f?g)nrfq
(Resr0)
          ! q0jq
(Resx)
          ! q0 2 Eg[ instantiation of x
fq
(T)
      ! q0jq
(T)
      ! q0 2 E ^ T 6= Resx;Resxg static resources
E00 = E0 [ fq
(T)
      ! q0j@q
(T)
      ! q0 2 E0 ^ @q 6
L   ! 2 Dg self loops minus
blocked actions
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lock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
read(Resi;Resz)
write(Resi;Resz; )
unlock(;Resm)
lock(Resi;Resm)
unlock(Resi;Resm)
write(Resi;Resz; )
read(Resi;Resz)
read(Resi;Resz)
write(Resi;Resz; )
unlock(Resi;Resm)
lock(Resi;Resm)
*
Figure 4.9: Completed Refusal Policy for Mutex Usage
Note the dierence in the denition of E00: we do not add a self loop if the actions
is considered impossible in that state. If we perform this instantiation on the refusal
policy in Figure 4.8 we obtain the automata in Figure 4.9. Note that there is no self
loop for lock(Resi;Resm; ) from state b. If, when checking a potential trace, we reach
a state where there is no transition for the next action in the trace then we assume
that the action is impossible and that the remainder of the trace is inaccessible due to
a blocked action. In such a case we don't need to check the remainder of the trace, only
to see if the blocked state is a sink. Conceptually, we only model check a trace until the
automaton blocks; formally, the set of traces we will check is:
Denition 4.10. OA'(r;R(U))(U)
def = f0j 2 U ^ 0 is largest prex of  s.t. q0
0
  !
g
where A'(r;R(U)) = h ; ;q0; ;Ei and q0
0
  !
 is the transitive closure of the reduction
relation E.
In order for model checking this set of traces to conservatively approximate model check-
ing using the resource semantics we require that each time the policy automaton is
blocked for a certain trace the resource semantics would also be blocked; conceptually,
any trace that we don't check due to blocking in the automaton must be a trace which
we wouldn't have checked due to blocking in the resource semantics. We can ensure
this property holds by requiring each automaton A'(r;R(U)) to simulate the resource se-
mantics. We can generate a simulation relation using standard techniques such as [19].
Given such a simulation relation, we can show that:
43Lemma 4.11. If A'(r;R(U)) simulates  with relation R then
8(q;) 2 R:q 6
L   ! )  6
L   !
This is trivially derivable from the denition of simulation. Given this property then we
can prove the following:
Theorem 4.12. If all traces dened by OA'(r;R(U))(U) are valid for A'(r;R(U)) then all
traces dened by O(U) are valid for A'(r;R(U)).
Hence, assuming that our automaton simulates the resource semantics, we model check
using the automaton rather than using the resource semantics. The cost of this approach
is generating the simulation relation. Given that the policy automaton is likely to change
far less frequently than the behaviour of a program during development, this should
signicantly reduce computation costs.
4.6 Conclusions
We demonstrate how to represent a concurrent usage using a trace equivalent single-
threaded usage. We use this representation to permit us to model check usages from
multi-threaded code on existing machinery [7] for model checking single-threaded code.
We extend the existing machinery to an analysis which disregards blocked traces. As
this analysis is more nely-grained we can recognise correctness where before we would
have returned a false positive with regards to errors (Example 4.2). This approach also
reduces the computational complexity of model checking as we only need to model check
using the policy automaton rather than using the automaton and the resource semantics.
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Dynamic Update
5.1 Introduction
There are various situations where the code of a program may be modied at run-time.
Operating systems may permit various extensions (normally drivers) to be installed to
better manage resources, for example per application thread schedulers or an alternate
disk access and caching for databases [9]. Commercial products may permit plugins to
customise them, for example in web browsers which can incorporate functionality from
control of music players to highlighting of web pages. Self-modifying code modies run-
time code for many reasons, most notably in testing to add or remove debugging code
without performing conditional jumps and in just-in-time compilation to optimise the
run-time code [17]. Dynamic software updating modies possibly stateful software to x
bugs and add functionality without shutting that software down, and guarantees some
safety property to hold over the update boundary [24,38,38,45]. Program generation is a
similar problem, and is commonly used in dynamic scripting languages such as Perl and
Python. In order to extend type and eect systems to languages which permit dynamic
modications we must permit the eect of code to likewise be modied.
When making a dynamic modication the programmer will want preserve previous be-
havioural properties after the modication. We refer to an update which maintains the
required behavioural properties as a behaviour safe update. An example is installing
drivers or extensions into an operating system kernel where any instabilities in the ex-
tension should not aect the rest of the kernel. This is often enforced by requiring the
extension, whilst being in the same address space as the kernel, to not access any mem-
ory except its own. This behavioural property can be represented in an eect system
tracking memory accesses [45], or using access policies.
We rst approach behaviour safe updates for variable type access systems (Section 5.2).
We present our plans for continuing our research on MDSU (Section 5.3). We conclude
in Section 5.4
455.2 Dynamic Modications for Variable Type Access Sys-
tems
In this section we describe how, in order to reason about the behavioural safety of an
update, we need to know the eect of the runtime code and the current state of the
resources [1]. This is as variable type safe access of resource depends on the state of
the resources as well as the eect of the code accessing those resources (Example 3.2).
We present infrastructure for modifying this eect and reasoning about its modied
form (Section 5.2.1). We present two possible approaches for obtaining the eect of
the runtime code besides doing a full type and eect analysis on the runtime code
(Section 5.2.3). We show how this work can be leveraged to give a runtime check of
behavioural update safety (Section 5.2.2).
5.2.1 Modifying Eects
In order to reason about the behavioural safety of dynamic modications we need to be
able to reason about how some code's eect can change at runtime. This depends on
the mechanism used for modifying the code.
5.2.1.1 Eect Annotation
The most common approach is to keep function denitions on the heap and to substitute
them into the code at their call sites rather than through the entire program after
denition (which is the standard functional programming approach) [24,25,37,39,45].
As the function denitions are on the heap the update mechanism simply has to change
these denitions, and from that point onwards the new denition will be substituted
whenever the function is called. This approach does not change the code of a function
which is being evaluated when the update occurs. For example:
Example 5.1.
(f(x1;x2) 7! ef;g() 7! eg);f(2;true); update; g()
! (f 7! ef;g 7! eg);ef[2=x1][true=x2]; update; g()
introduce an update which maps f to e0
f and g to e0
g
! (f(x1;x2) 7! e0
f;g() 7! e0
g);ef[2=x1][true=x2]; update; g()
:::
! (f(x1;x2) 7! e0
f;g() 7! e0
g);g()
! (f(x1;x2) 7! e0
f;g() 7! e0
g);e0
g
Note that the inlined body of f is not changed by the update.
46A generalisation of this approach is to include named regions of code. These annotations
in the source code denote regions of code which can be replaced in their entirety e.g.:
3 + 4; main(accl1; accl2); accl3 (5.1)
where main is a name and accl1; accl2 is the annotated region. Updates then consist
of mappings from annotation names to new region bodies, e.g. (main 7! accl4; accl2),
and the update mechanism consists of doing the substitution of main(e0) for main( ).
This approach alone, however, is not suitable for modifying code with side eects, as
we have no connection between some code and its eect without doing a type and eect
analysis. For example, the code in Equation 5.1 has the eect:
L1; L2; L3 (5.2)
where Li represents li. We cannot tell, by looking at the eect alone, the eect which
corresponds with the annotated code. A similar problem would occur if we used the
function-specic DSU approach above. This is a problem if we want to see how an
update modies the eect of some code without having to redo the entire eect analysis.
Our solution to this problem is to include annotations on the eect as well as the code.
This links the code of an annotated regions to its eect. Assuming we have the eect
of some running code, suitably annotated, we can use this infrastructure to determine
what the eect of some updated code is without having to redo the eect analysis for
the modied code (Section 5.2.1.3).
5.2.1.2 Position of Updates
It is possible to apply an update to every annotated region as soon as it becomes avail-
able. This has two problems: reasoning about updates, and proving their safety.
As discussed in Section 2.4 with respects to Figure 2.1 if an update occurs in an in-
opportune place, generally anywhere besides the start of the main loop or a dedicated
function for performing updates, the programmer's reasoning about what it will do can
be broken. In the case of the example in Figure 2.1 a log entry can be lost. We make use
of a language construct dmod(e) which denotes that updates can occur to code within
the construct. Intuitively this means that for the code:
e1; dmod(e2)
that an update will not be visible in the execution of this program until it reaches the
code e2. This approach is a slight modication of the standard DSU technique of using
an update keyword to denote where an update will occur [13,16,25,39,45]. We do this
47in order to aid syntactic reasoning about where and when updates to occur within code's
eect.
It is possible to use transactional techniques to obtain a useful reasoning paradigm for
updates and more liberality on where updates can be applied to code, for simple type
updates [38]. This may be useful for extending our approach to a static analysis, and is
part of our proposed future work (Section 5.3).
5.2.1.3 Formal Denitions
We dene a simple lambda-calculus with recursive functions and a single eectful prim-
itive accl such as in [32,40]. We also include the language construct dmod(e) which we
use to syntactically dene where and when a system may perform dynamically modica-
tions, and name(e) which denotes a section of code which can be replaced in its entirety.
Hence expressions and eects are dened as:
Denition 5.1.
e ::= v
j recf=x:e
j ee
j accl
j ifetheneelsee
j accl&(T1)e1;:::;Tn)en)
j dmod(e)
j name(e)
v ::= n
j b
j ()
j r
j x
P ::= hei
j PkP
' ::= 
j (L;T)
j ';'
j '+'
j '&'
j t:'
j dmod(')
j name(')
We refer to parallel code as well formed if none of the annotation names used by one
thread are used by any other. We assume code is well formed. The current state of the
shared resource(s) and the multi-threaded code which has yet to be executed is referred
to as a snapshot of a system. We add additional reduction and type rules for the new
constructs (Figure 5.2).
An update is a set of mappings from annotation names to expressions:
Denition 5.2.
 ::= name7!e
j ;
where updates are well formed with respects to some code if the simple types of the
replacement and the old code are the same. We assume well formed updates. We dene
the update mechanism in Figure 5.1. The boolean in this function denotes whether the
code or eect in the argument is syntactically within a dmod construct. Intuitively these
48upd(P;;b)
def =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
upd(P1;;false) k upd(P2;;false) P = P1 k P2
P  = (L;T) _ 
upd(e1;;b); upd(e2;;b) P = e1; e2
upd(e1;;b) + upd(e2;;b) P = e1 + e2
upd(e1;;b)&upd(e2;;b) P = e1&e2
t:upd(e;;b) P = t:e
dmod(upd(e;;true)) P = dmod(e)
name(upd(e;;b)) P = name(e)^
(b = false _ name = 2 dom())
name((name)) P = name(e) ^ b = true^
name 2 dom()
upd(;;b)
def =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
upd(1;;false) k upd(2;;false)  = 1 k 2
  = (L;T) _ 
upd('1;;b); upd('2;;b)  = '1; '2
upd('1;;b)&upd('2;;b)  = '1 + '2
upd('1;;b)&(upd('2;;b))  = '1&'2
t:upd(';;b)  = t:'
dmod(upd(';;true))  = dmod(')
name(upd(';;b))  = name(')^
(b = false _ name = 2 dom())
name('0)  = name( ) ^ b = true^
name 2 dom()^
; ` (name) : T B '0
Figure 5.1: Updating Code and Eects
(RAnnot)
[]name(e)  ![]e
(RDmod)
[]dmod(e)  ![]e
(RUpdNaive)
[]P  ![]upd(P;;false)
' o   ` e: T
(:TAnnot)
name(') o   ` name(e): T
' o   ` e: T fv(e) = ;
(:TDmod)
dmod(') o   ` dmod(e): T
Figure 5.2: Additional Rules for Updateable Systems
functions replace annotated code sections if they are within a dmod construct and there
is an update for that annotation. For example:
Example 5.2.
upd(f(e1); dmod(f(e1); g(e2));(f 7! e3);false)
= upd(f(e1);;false); upd(dmod(f(e1); g(e2));;false)
where  = (f 7! e3)
= f(upd(e1;;false)); upd(dmod(f(e1); g(e2));;false)
= f(upd(e1;;false)); dmod(upd(f(e1); g(e2);;true))
= f(e1); dmod(f(e3); g(e2))
49where there are no annotated regions in e1,e2. Note that this replaces the annotation
associated with f inside the dmod, but not the one outside it. This corresponds to our
intuition that an update does not become visible until we encounter a dmod construct.
We can then prove that this transformation maintains the link between code and its
eect.
Conjecture 5.3. Eect Safe Update
If  o   ` P : T and  is well formed with respects to P then
upd(;;false) o   ` upd(P;;false): T
5.2.2 Runtime Safety Check
In order to guarantee that all accesses are type safe we do model checking, or some
check which implies model checking, of the property that irrespective of interleaving of
accesses that the same type is always returned. When we modify code we also modify
its eect. Hence in order to prove that the modied code is still access safe we need
to redo model checking on the new eect. Specically, in order to guarantee that the
update rule:
(RUpdNaive)
[]P  ![]upd(P;;false)
respects Subject Reduction (Theorem 3.3.4.1):
` P :  ^ []P   ! [0]P0 )` P0: 0 ^    ! 0
we have to show that:
` P :  ^ :  ^ compatible(upd(;;false);)
Intuitively this requires that the updated eect be compatible with the current state of
the resources. We hence extend the update reduction rule to include this runtime safety
check:
:  `P :  compatible(upd(;;false);)
(RUpd)
[]P  ![]upd(P;;false)
As, by Theorem 5.3, upd(;;false) correctly represents the eect of upd(P;;false),
if we can show that the modied eect respects compatibility then the modied code
will respect subject reduction.
5.2.3 Obtaining the Eect of Runtime Code
The runtime check in Section 5.2.2 requires that we know the eect of the code being
update. We do not want to have to redo the eect analysis at runtime as this would
50[];e1;'1  ![0];e0
1;'0
1
(RMAppOne)
[];e1 e2;'1;'2  ![0];e0
1 e2;'0
1;'2
[];e2;'2  ![0];e0
2;'0
1
(RMAppTwo)
[];v e2;'2  ![0];v e0
2;'0
2
(RMAppThree)
[];recf=x:ev;'  ![];e[recf=x:e=f][v=x];'

l   !0
(RMAcc)
[];accl;(L;T)  ![0];(l);
(RMAnnot)
[];name(e);name(')  ![];e;'
[];e1;'1  ![0];e0
1;'0
1
(RMIfOne)
[];ife1 thene2 elsee3;'1;'2+'3  ![0];ife0
1 thene2 elsee3;'0
1;'2+'3
(RMIfTwo)
[];iftruethene2 elsee3;'2+'3  ![];e2;'2
(RMIfThree)
[];iffalsethene2 elsee3;'2+'3  ![];e3;'3

l   !0 (l): Ti
(RMExtChoice)
[];accl&(T1)e1;:::;Tn)en);(L;T1);'1&:::&(L;Tn);'n  ![0];ei;'i
[];e;'  ![0];e0;'0
(RMProc)
[];hei;'  ![0];he0i;'0
[];P1;1  ![0];P0
1;0
1
(RMParOne)
[];P1kP2;1k2  ![0];P0
1kP2;0
1k2
[];P2;2  ![0];P0
2;0
2
(RMParTwo)
[];P1kP2;1k2  ![0];P1kP0
2;1k0
2
:  compatible(upd(;;false);)
(RMUpd)
[];P;  ![];upd(P;;false);upd(;;false)
Figure 5.3: Semantics For Runtime Modelling
mean suspending the system for longer than we would like. Instead we would like to be
able to obtain the eect of the current code by some other method. We refer to methods
for obtaining the eect of runtime code as eect capture methods.
Fully model checking the compatibility property would also requiring suspending the
system for infeasible lengths of time. If, however, we are using some linear-sized predicate
check on the eect instead of model checking then the suspension time may be acceptable.
5.2.3.1 Runtime Modelling
We can take the eect from the eect analysis when the code is rst analysed (before
the update) and evolve it along with the code at runtime. We present a semantics which
reduces the eect with the code in Figure 5.3. We can then prove subject reduction
as in Section 5.2.2. The advantages of this approach are that the eect is instantly
available and has minimal space requirements. The disadvantage is the computation
cost of running the model.
51x: T 2  
(:TAVar)
; o ' o   ` x: T
l: L '0 = (L;T); '
(:TAAcc)
(L;T) o '0 o   ` acclf'0g: T
' o  ;x: T1;f : T1
'
  ! T2 ` e: T2
(:TALam)
; o   ` recf = x:e: T1
'
  ! T2
'1 o'2;'3;'o `e1: T1
'3   !T2 '2 o'3;'o `e2: T1
(:TAApp)
'1; '2; '3 o ' o   ` e1 e2: T2
'1 o '2  '3;' o   ` e1: Bool '2 o'o `e2: T '3 o'o `e3: T
(:TAIfExpr)
'1; ('2  '3) o ' o   ` ife1 thene2 elsee3: T
'i o '0 o   ` ei: T   ` l: L ' = (L;T1); '1&:::&(L;Tn); 'n
(:TAExtChoice)
' o '0 o   ` accl&(T1 ) e1;:::;Tn ) en)f'; '0g: T
l = (v1;:::;vn) L = (T1;:::;Tn) ; o   ` vi: Ti
(:TALab)
  ` l: L
' o '0 o   ` e: T fv(e) = ;
(:TAAnnot)
name(') o '0 o   ` name(e): T
' o '0 o   ` e: T fv(e) = ;
(:TAModDef)
dmod(') o '0 o   ` dmod(e)fdmod(');'0g: T
'i o ; o ; ` ei: Ti :  compatible('1 k ::: k 'n;)
(:TAPar)
` he1i k ::: k heni: '1 k ::: k 'n
` P :  :  compatible(;)
(:ValidThreads)
 ` P : 
where
compatible(;)
)compGen(;)
Figure 5.4: Annotating Type Rules
5.2.3.2 Annotation
It is possible to, during the eect analysis, transform the code into a runtime format
which annotates the eect of the code from that point onwards onto constructs relevant
to updates.
We redene the access, external choice, and update point constructs:
Denition 5.4.
e ::= :::
j accl&(T1)e1;:::;Tn)en)f'g
j acclf'g
j dmod(e)f'g
The eect annotated on these constructs denotes the eect of this construct and of
all code following it. This technique uses the eect system to `look ahead', and this
`future eect' is annotated on the construct. This is a use of the contextual eects
approach [38]. We redene the eect system in Figure 5.4. We extend our normal type
and eect judgement to:
' o '0 o   ` e: T
52which denotes that, under type variable assumptions  , an expression e has simple type
T and its evaluation is approximated by '. Additionally, '0 denotes the eect of code
following the expression. Note that, in the majority of rules, this eect is not dened, it
is simply stated; we cannot determine what follows after the construct as we don't have
that code. Instead we determine this eect by unication, using the two rules which
place constraints on how the future eect is constructed. The TAApp rule denes that the
eect of the code following e1 consists of the eect of e2, the latent eect of the function
which e1 evaluates to, followed by the eect of the code following the entire expression.
The eect of the code following e2 consists of the latent eect of the function e1 evaluates
to and the eect the code following the entire expression. The TAPar rule stipulates that
there is no eect of code following the body of a thread ('i o ; o ; ` ei: Ti) as there is
no code following the body of a thread.
When we use annotation all we need to do to determine the eect of some code is search
for the next annotated statement and extract the eect:
Denition 5.5.
extract(P)
def =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
 P = v _ recf = x:e
extract(e1) P = e1 e2 ^ extract(e1) 6= 
extract(e2) P = e1 e2 ^ extract(e1) = 
extract(e1) P = ife1 thene2 elsee3 ^ extract(e1) 6= 
extract(e2) + extract(e3) P = ife1 thene2 elsee3 ^ extract(e1) = 
' P = acclf'g
' P = accl&(T1 ) e1;:::;Tn ) en)f'g
' P = dmod(e)f'g
extract(e) P = name(e)
extract(P1)kextract(P2) P = P1 k P2
We could annotate all constructs with the future eects. The eect is only dened,
however, by the access, external choice, region annotation, and dynamic modication
points; between the other constructs the eect is not changed and it would expand the
code unnecessarily to annotate these points. We do not annotate the `region annotation'
construct as:
upd(name(e);;false) = upd(e;;false)
Unless we are within a dynamic modication point when using the update function, we
ignore the region annotation. If an annotation region is outside a dynamic modication
including the region annotation makes no dierence and we can continue inside the
region to the next relevant construct. If it is within a dynamic modication construct
then we would have already hit that when extracting the eect. Hence we can safely
not annotate named regions with the future eect.
We posit that this extracted eect comprises the code's eect (the proof is future work):
53Conjecture 5.6. Correct Eect Annotation
If P is code which has been annotated by a prior eect analysis then ` P : extract(P)
Assuming Lemma 5.6 is correct then we can dene a semantics which is the same as in
Section 5.2.1.3 except for with a modied update reduction:
:  compatible(upd(extract(P);;false);)
(RAUpd)
[]P  ![]upd(P;;false)
We can then prove subject reduction as in Section 5.2.2. The advantage of this approach
is that it doesn't require running a model of the eect as well as the code. The dis-
advantage is that code size is increased as we annotate the future eect everywhere it
could be relevant.
5.3 Future Work
We present a series of possible problems related to DSU which we hope to cover during
the remainder of the thesis. In particular these cover approaches which will allow us to
develop a static rather than dynamic analysis, technique of covering dierent types of
updates, and eciency issues.
5.3.1 Dynamic Modications for Access Policy Systems
Both the resource access with variably typed return and the access policy systems use
model checking on the eect of code. Hence we posit that it would be possible, in theory
to use the same approach for access policies. Namely this approach is to annotate the
code with updateable regions, use an eect capture method to obtain the runtime eect,
modify it using the update mechanism, and then use the model checking techniques
for multi-threaded programs using access policies (Chapter 4). Unfortunately, as model
checking tends to be a time-consuming process, this is probably infeasible for a runtime
check. Hence in order to update access policy systems we need to do a static analysis.
5.3.2 Comparing Eect Capture Methods
The runtime modelling method evaluates the eect of the code, determined by an initial
eect analysis, alongside the evaluation of the code. This has the obvious advantage
that the eect is instantly available (we need not delve through the code to nd it on an
annotation), and compared to the annotation model it requires little space. Eectively
it requires one copy of the code's eect to be recorded (and updated). The annotation
method eectively requires us to record the entire eect of the code every time the eect
54changes; intuitively this seems be exponential in the size of the eect. The disadvantage
of this approach is running the eect alongside the code, specically ensuring they
evaluate in lockstep. In practice this would probably require mutual exclusion, which
would slow down the system.
The main advantage of the annotation method is that it does not require evaluating the
eect in lockstep, which would eliminate the slow-down related to mutual exclusion. It
might, however, introduce a slow-down related to the annotations; the runtime processor
would need to deal with the additional, normally unused, annotations of code. Addi-
tionally, the number of annotations may make the code infeasibly large. If, however,
we can use transactional techniques to reduce the places where eects can be visibly
introduced (Section 5.3.3) we may be able to reduce the number of places we need to
annotate the code.
We propose to, after developing an example implementation of our system, run bench-
marks to compare these two methods. We also propose to investigate using transactional
techniques to reduce the number of annotation points.
5.3.3 Transactional Update Approach and Static Analyses
In [37] the authors use an approach which determines induced update points which
are program points p such that if an update is applied when a thread reaches p, the
program will behave as if the patch had been applied at some other update point p0.
The authors also use transactional techniques to denote regions which must appear to
have run with entirely the old code or entirely the new code. This is similar to where
transactions appear to have occurred using exactly one version of a database. The
induced update points allow the authors to determine entire regions where updates can
be applied and appear as if the update occurred at a specic, later point. These `safe'
regions are determined threadwise. The innovative technique for MDSU in [37] is simply
to apply the update when all threads are in safe regions, and not to try to force them
to synchronise on these regions in any way. This reduces the delay cost of requiring
threads to synchronise for an update and the possibility of deadlocking whilst waiting.
Additionally these points can be statically determined for each thread, so it is statically
possible to know whether there could, theoretically, be any overlap in points where all
can safely perform the updates (i.e. whether the threads' respective safe regions are all
safe for the aspects of the code being updated). We hope to be able to extend our work
to similarly use transactional techniques which would allow a fully static analysis.
5.3.4 Updates Dependent on State of Accompanying Resources
In some situations we may wish to apply an update for the entire system to dierent
threads at dierent times. We explain with an example; consider a producer-consumer
55system:
'pk'c
'p = h:dmod(f((snd(Resc; Int); Unit);(snd(Resc; Int); Bool);(snd(Resc; Int); Unit);h))
'c = h0:dmod(g((rcv(Resc); Int);(rcv(Resc); Bool);(rcv(Resc); Int);h0))
In this example we have two threads, one which repeatedly sends an integer, followed
by a boolean, followed by another integer, and one which receives values of these types.
Using standard asynchronous message passing semantics the producer is never blocked
by the receiver, and can `speed ahead' and send more triples of data than the receiver
has received. Hence we can end up with a situation where the state system resembles:
[c 7! Int; Int; Bool; Int; Int; Bool]'pk'c
i.e. there are two iterations worth of data waiting for the consumer. Consider an update
which changes the system so that there are only two values sent per iteration:
 = f 7! (snd(Resc; Int); Unit);(snd(Resc; Int); Bool);
g 7! (rcv(Resc); Int);(rcv(Resc); Bool)
If we attempt to apply this update to the system we will cause an error as the consumer
will attempt to do the actions:
(rcv(Resc); Int);(rcv(Resc); Bool)
on a resource:
c 7! Int; Int;:::
This update is not, however, fundamentally incompatible with this system. We could
apply the update to the producer immediately, and only apply it to the consumer once
it has consumed all the data sent to it under the old protocol. We can represent this by
including with each region update a predicate p on the state of the shared resources, i.e.
 ::= name7!(e;p)
j ;
We would then need to modify the update mechanism to, rather than applying the
update immediately when it is obtained, wait until dmod constructs are encountered,
to check whether the predicate is fullled, and if so to apply the update to the code
within the dmod. This would require retaining update denitions in conjunction with
the accompanying shared resources in the runtime conguration: [];P;. In such a
56system we would remove the RUpd rule and modify the RDmod rule into:
 = 0;00
8name 2 dom(0):(name) = ( ;p) ^ p() = true
8name 2 dom(00):(name) = ( ;p) ^ p() = false
(RDDmod)
[];dmod(e);  ![];upd(e;0;true);00
Conceptually this removes the boolean check as to whether the update function is within
a dmod as updates now always occur at RDmod constructs, and adds the semantics that
we only perform updates which have a valid predicate in the current state.
We should still be able to, when an update is introduced, model check to see whether
applying the update will lead to violating subject reduction or not. We could also use
similar techniques of simpler predicates and invariability proofs as well as transaction
approaches for static analyses.
5.4 Conclusions
We develop infrastructure to permit us to determine the eect of some updated code
using the runtime eect of some runtime code by using code and eect annotations. We
show what properties we need in order to guarantee that an update preserves Subject
Reduction. We explore possible eect capture methods to determine the eect of runtime
code. We present future work which includes approaches to permit more permissive
updates whose application are dependent on the runtime state of the resources, and
techniques which may permit us to create a static analysis with minimum runtime costs.
57Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Plan
We present our future work by topic below. We present our timetable for the remainder
of the Ph.D. in Figure 6.1.
6.1.0.1 Resource Access with Variably Typed Return
We plan to explore invariability predicates and invariability proofs (Section 3.4). We
expect that there are common aspects of these predicates and proofs which we may be
able to extract and prove more generally, in order to reduce even more the burden of
proof on the resource system architect. We intend to incorporate the approach taken
to dynamic resources and model checking properties using them from [7] into variably
typed return systems.
Month Activity
25 Formalise DSU for access policy systems
26 Explore examples of and themes occurring in invariability proofs
27 Incorporate dynamic resources into variably typed return systems
28-29 Transactional approach to updates and static analysis
30 Integrating model checking techniques from variably typed
return and access policy systems
31-32 Implementation
33-36 Write up Thesis
37 Submit Thesis
Figure 6.1: Work plan for the remainder of the Ph.D.
596.1.0.2 Dynamic Software Updating
We will to formalise our intuition about DSU for access policy systems. We intend
to expand our approach to incorporate updates which are dependent on the state of
the shared resources. We hope to use transactional techniques demonstrated in [37]
to create an update mechanism which requires less synchronisation but also has fewer
possible interleavings with respects to when updates can occur and hence make a static
analysis feasible. After doing our implementation we will benchmark and compare our
dierent eect capture systems.
6.1.0.3 Other
We intend to provide a sample implementation of our functional concurrent language
which makes use of shared resources. We will implement the analyses designed in this
thesis which guarantee the type safe use of the shared resources and that the code's eect
respects the access policies. We will implement the dynamic safety checks and hopefully a
static analysis to guarantee that updates do not break the proved behavioural properties.
6.2 Closing Thoughts
We use the established technique of model checking to prove dierent formal behavioural
properties for concurrent programs. We generalise session typing approaches to reveal
the essence of their approaches and to simplify their proofs. We expand access policy
techniques to cover multi-threaded programs. We show how to modify running concur-
rent programs whilst maintaining behavioural safety properties using dynamic safety
checks. We posit how to extend our approach to encompass more expressive updates
and how to develop a fully static analysis.
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64Appendix: Policies
.1 Trace Denitions
@h: (h)  U
(:TUsage)
U ` Exp(U;; )
9h: (h)  P
(:TParTerm)
h ` Exp(P;; )
@h: (h)  x:P U ` Exp(P;; )
(:TParName)
x:U ` Exp(x:P;; )
@h: (h)P1kP2 U1`Exp(P1;; ) U2`Exp(P2;; )
U0
1`next(U1;;;P2;; ;;) U0
2`next(U2;;;P1;; ;;)
(:TPar)
U0
1 + U0
2 ` Exp(P1kP2;; )
U ` Exp(PkU0;;( ;))
(:TEmpt)
U ` next(;U0;P;; ;)
U ` Exp(Pk(h);U0;;( ;))
(:TRecVar)
U ` next(h;U0;P;; ;)
U ` Exp(PkU0;;( ;))
(:TAction)
(T);U ` next((T);U0;P;; ;)
U ` next(U1;U2;U0;P;; ;)
(:TSeq)
U ` next(U1;U2;U0;P;; ;)
U0
i ` next(Ui;U0;P;; ;) i 2 1;2
(:TIntChoice)
U0
1 + U0
2 ` next(U1 + U2;U0;P;; ;)
U0
i ` next(Ui;U0;P;; ;) i 2 1;2
(:TExtChoice)
U0
1&U0
2 ` next(U1&U2;U0;P;; ;)
U ` next(U00;U0;P;; ;)
(:TName)
x:U ` next(x:U00;U0;P;; ;)
U ` next(U00;U0;P;[h 7! h:U00]; ;[h0 7! Pkh:U00;U0]) h0 free in ; ;
(:TRecDef)
h0:U ` next(h:U00;U0;P;; ;)
65.2 Interleaving Denitions
V ` intSingle(U) @h: (h) = U
(:IUsage)
V ` Traces(U;; )
9h: (h) = P
(:IParTerm)
fhg ` Traces(P;; )
@h: (h) = x:P V ` Traces(P;; )
(:IParName)
fx:UjU 2 V g ` Traces(x:P;; )
@h: (h)=P1kP2 V1`Traces(P1;; ) V2`Traces(P2;; )
V 0
1`intSubSet(V1;;;P2;; ;;) V 0
2`intSubSet(V2;;;P1;; ;;)
(:IPar)
V 0
1 [ V 0
2 ` Traces(P1kP2;; )
V 00 ` intSub(U;U0;P;; ;)
(:ISubSet) [
U2V;U02V 0
V 00 ` intSubSet(V;V 0;P;; ;)
V ` Traces(PkU0;;( ;))
(:IEmpt)
V ` intSub(;U0;P;; ;)
V ` Traces(Pk(h);U0;;( ;))
(:IRecVar)
V ` intSub(h;U0;P;; ;)
V ` Traces(PkU0;;( ;))
(:IAction)
f(T);UjU 2 V g ` intSub((T);U0;P;; ;)
V ` intSub(U1;U2;U0;P;; ;)
(:ISeq)
V ` intSub(U1;U2;U0;P;; ;)
V 0
i ` intSub(Ui;U0;P;; ;) i 2 1;2
(:IIntChoice)
V 0
1 [ V 0
2 ` intSub(U1 + U2;U0;P;; ;)
V 0
i ` intSub(Ui;U0;P;; ;) i 2 1;2
(:IExtChoice)
V 0
1 [ V 0
2 ` intSub(U1&U2;U0;P;; ;)
V ` intSub(U;U0;P;; ;)
(:IName)
fx:U00jU00 2 V g ` intSub(x:U;U0;P;; ;)
V ` intSub(U;U0;P;[h 7! h:U]; ;[h0 7! Pkh:U;U0]) h0 free in ; ;
(:IRecDef)
fh:U00jU00 2 V g ` intSub(h:U;U0;P;; ;)
(:ISEmpt)
fg ` intSingle()
(:ISAction)
f(T)g ` intSingle((T))
(:ISAction)
fhg ` intSingle(h)
Vi ` intSingle(Ui) i 2 1;2
(:ISSeq)
fU0
1;U0
2jU0
i 2 Vig ` intSingle(U1;U2)
Vi ` intSingle(Ui) i 2 1;2
(:ISIntChoice)
V1 [ V2 ` intSingle(U1 + U2)
Vi ` intSingle(Ui) i 2 1;2
(:ISExtChoice)
V1 [ V2 ` intSingle(U1&U2)
V ` intSingle(U)
(:ISRecDef)
fh:U0jU0 2 V g ` intSingle(h:U)
V ` intSingle(U)
(:ISNewName)
fx:U0jU0 2 V g ` intSingle(x:U)
66.3 Degree Denitions
d(P;; ) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 9h0: (h0) = P
d(U) P = U 6= h ^ @h0: (h0) = P
d((h)) P = h ^ @h0: (h0) = P
1 + d(P0;; ) P = x:P0 ^ @h0: (h0) = P
dn(d(P1;; );d(P2;; )) P = P1kP2 ^ @h0: (h0) = P
d(U) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 U =  _ U = h
1 U = (T)
d(U1) + d(U2) U = U1;U2
1 + max(d(U1);d(U2)) U = U1;U2
1 + d(U0) U = x:U0 _ U = h:U0
dn(n1;n2) =
8
> <
> :
n1 n2 = 0
n2 n1 = 0
3 + max(dn(n1   1;n2);dn(n1;n2   1)) n1;n2 > 0
67.4 Properties and Proofs
Lemma .1. Left and right strictness dn(n1 + 1;n2) > dn(n1;n2)
Proof:
Case n2 = 0
n1 + 1 > n1
Case n1 = 0
dn(0 + 1;n2) = 3 + max(dn(0;n2);dn(1;n2   1))
dn(0;n2) = n2
Case dn(0;n2) > dn(1;n2   1)
dn(1;n2) = 3 + dn(0;n2) > dn(0;n2)
Case dn(0;n2) < dn(1;n2   1)
dn(1;n2) = 3 + dn(1;n2   1) > dn(0;n2)
Case n1;n2 > 0
dn(n1 + 1;n2) = 3 + max(dn(n1;n2);dn(n1 + 1;n2   1))
Case dn(n1;n2) > dn(n1 + 1;n2   1)
dn(n1 + 1;n2) = 3 + dn(n1;n2)
> dn(n1;n2)
Case dn(n1;n2) < dn(n1 + 1;n2   1)
dn(n1 + 1;n2) = 3 + dn(n1 + 1;n2   1)
> 3 + dn(n1;n2)
Right strictness follows similarly.
Corollary .2. If n1 > n2 where n1;n2 > 0 then dn(n1;n2) = 3 + dn(n1   1;n2)
68Lemma .3. 1 + dn(n1;n2) < 3 + dn(n1   1;n2)
Proof:
Case n2 = 0
1 + dn(n1;n2) = 1 + n1
3 + dn(n1   1;n2) = 3 + n1
1 + n1 < 3 + n1
Case n1 = 0
1 + dn(n1;n2) = 1 + n2
3 + dn(n1   1;n2) = 3 + n2
1 + n2 < 3 + n2
Case n1;n2 > 0
Case n1 > n2
1 + dn(n1;n2) = 1 + (3 + max(dn(n1   1;n2);dn(n1;n2   1)))
= 1 + (3 + dn(n1   1;n2)) by corollary .2
3 + dn(n1   1;n2) = 3 + (3 + max(dn(n1   2;n2);dn(n1   1;n2   1)))
irrespective of whether dn(n1   2;n2) > dn(n1   1;n2   1) or dn(n1  
2;n2);dn(n1   1;n2   1), both are structurally smaller than the current
case and hence: 1+(3+dn(n1 1;n2)) < 3+(3+max(dn(n1 2;n2);dn(n1 
1;n2   1))).
Case n1 > n2
similar to case n1;n2 > 0
Corollary .4. n3 < n1 ) 1 + dn(n1;n2) < 3 + dn(n3   1;n2)
69Lemma .5. P 6 U ^ U0 ` Exp(P;; ) ) d(U0;; ) < d(P;; )
Proof: by induction over the structure of P.
Case (TParTerm)
9h: (h)  P
(:TParTerm)
h ` Exp(P;; )
d(h;; ) = 0
d(P;; ) of all P 6 are all > 0.
Case (TParName)
@h: (h)  x:P U ` Exp(P;; )
(:TParName)
x:U ` Exp(x:P;; )
by induction, if P0 6 U0 then d(x:U;; ) < d(P0;; )
d(P;; ) = 1 + d(P0;; )
hence 1 + d(x:U;; ) < 1 + d(P0;; )
Case (TPar)
@h: (h)P1kP2 U1`Exp(P1;; ) U2`Exp(P2;; )
U0
1`next(U1;;;P2;; ;;) U0
2`next(U2;;;P1;; ;;)
(:TPar)
U0
1 + U0
2 ` Exp(P1kP2;; )
d(U0
1+U0
2;; ) = 1+max(dn(d(U1;; );d(P2;; ));dn(d(U2;; );d(P1;; )))
where Ui ` Exp(Pi;; )
d(P1kP2;; ) = dn(d(P1;; );d(P2;; ))
= 3 + max(dn(n1   1;n2);dn(n1;n2   1)) where ni = d(Pi;; )
We need to show:
1 + max(d(dn(d(U1;; );d(P2;; )));dn(d(U2;; );d(P1;; ))) <
3 + max(dn(n1   1;n2);dn(n1;n2   1))
Case dn(d(U1;; );d(P2;; )) > dn(d(U2;; );d(P1;; )) ^
dn(d(P1;; )   1;d(P2;; )) > dn(d(P1;; );d(P2;; )   1)
Case P1  U1
dn(d(P1;; )   1;d(P2;; )) = dn(d(U1;; )   1;d(P2;; ))
using TUsage. Hence by Lemma .3 we have
1+dn(d(U1;; );d(P2;; )) < 3+dn(d(U1;; ) 1;d(P2;; ))
Case P1 6 U1
By induction U1 ` Exp(P1;; ) ) d(U1;; ) < d(P1;; )
70hence by Corollary .4
1+d(dn(d(U1;; );d(P2;; ))) < 3+d(dn(d(P1;; ) 1;d(P2;; )))
Other cases with dierent maximum values are similar.
71We represent: Exp(P;; ) as ;  P and next(U;U0;P;; ;) as ;( ;) PkU;U0.
Lemma .6. If Exp(P0;0; 0) succeeds Exp(P;; ), P 6 hkP0, and P 6 U1kU2 then
d(P0;0; 0) < d(P;; ).
Proof: by inspection of the tableau rules and by the denition of degree. This is straight-
forward apart from TPar:
Case TPar
@h: (h)P1kP2 U1`Exp(P1;; ) U2`Exp(P2;; )
U0
1`next(U1;;;P2;; ;;) U0
2`next(U2;;;P1;; ;;)
(:TPar)
U0
1 + U0
2 ` Exp(P1kP2;; )
We can prove this straightforwardly apart from when P1  U1 or P2  U2. In
the rst case U2 ` Exp(P2;; ) ) d(U2;; ) < d(P2;; ) by Lemma .5.
The second case follows similarly.
72Denition .7. 0; 0 P0kh0;U0 C-succeeds ;  Pkh;U if there is a sequence of sequents
succeeding each other so that no intermediary sequent is of the form 00; 00 P00kh00;U00.
Lemma .8. If 0; 0 P0kh0;U0 C-succeeds ;  Pkh;U then either:
1. 9h00 such that  (h00)  P0k(h0);U0 or
2. h0 2 fv(Pk(h);U) [ fhg or
3. d(P0kh0;U0;0; 0) < d(Pkh;U;; ) and fv(P0k(h0);U0)  fv(Pk(h);U) [ fhg
Proof:
If h0 = h, U0 = U, and P0 = P, then using the TRecDef rule we will have created a
h00 2 dom( 0) such that  (h00)  P0k(h0);U0.
Otherwise, suppose (h) = h:U1. Either P0k(h0);U0 is a subformula of Pk(h);U, or
h0 is introduced as h0:U2. In the rst case h0 2 fv(Pk(h);U)[fhg. In the second case
h0:U2 is a subformula of PkU1;U, in which case d(P0kh0;U0;0; 0) < d(Pkh;U;; )
and fv(P0k(h0);U0)  fv(Pk(h);U) [ fhg.
73Lemma .9. If  is a prex of 0 and fv(P)  dom() then d(; ;P) = d(0; ;P).
74Theorem .10. Each trace tableau is nite.
Proof:
Assume an innite tableau  for parallel usage P. As  is nite branching, and P contains
only nitely many single-threaded usages U in parallel, there must be an innite path
 through .
Since d(P;; ), d(U), and dn(n1;n2) are all positive descending measures, for all P
except those with leading constants, then by Lemma .8 part 3 then there must be an
innite C path in , c =<i; i Pikhi;Ui >. As the model is nite, no one constant
can occur innitely often.
For the rst h in the path, h0, fv(0) = fhg, as we have unwrapped no other denitions.
The following h1 can then be one of the cases, by Lemma .8:
1. (h1) = h1:U0
1 ^  (h 1) = P1kU0
1;U1, in which case we have a contradiction as
this terminates using the TTerm rule.
2. h1 2 fv(P0k0(h0);U0) [ fh0g. As we have introduced no other bindings in 0
then fv(0) = fhg, and hence h1 = h0
3. d(P1kh1;U1;1; 1) < d(P0kh0;U0;0; 0) and fv(P1k(h1);U1)  fv(P0k0(h0);U0)[
fh0g
We can nd a chain of hi using the second case. Consider some hi0 is the last h in this
chain. Then, using the third case:
d(Pii0+1khii0+1;Uii0+1;ii0+1; ii0+1) < d(Pi0khi0;Ui0;i0; i0) and
fv(Pii0+1k(hii0+1);Uii0+1)  fv(Pi0ki0(hi0);Ui0) [ fhi0g.
By repeating this argument suciently often we obtain a contradiction as d(P;; ),
d(U), and dn(n1;n2) are all non-negative integer measures.
Theorem .11. Each int tableau is nite.
Proof: similar to Theorem .10.
75Lemma .12. intSubSet(Traces(U;;Traces(U0;;( ;)));Traces(U0;;Traces(U0;;( ;)));P;; ;) =
intSingle(next(U;U0;P;; ;))
Proof: by induction over the structure of U
Case U = h
intSubSet(Traces(U;;Traces(U0;;( ;)));Traces(U0;;Traces(U0;;( ;)));P;; ;)
= intSubSet(fhg;Traces(U0;;( ;));P;; ;)
=
S
U002Traces(U0;;( ;)) intSub(h;U00;P;; ;)
=
S
U002Traces(U0;;( ;)) Traces(PkU000;U00;;( ;))
where (h) = h:U000
intSingle(next(U;U0;P;; ;))
= intSingle(Exp(PkU000;U0;;( ;)))
=
S
U002Traces(U0;;( ;)) intSingle(Exp(PkU000;U00;;( ;)))
=
S
U002Traces(U0;;( ;)) Traces(Exp(PkU000;U00;;( ;));;( ;))
where (h) = h:U000 then Traces(PkU000;U00;;( ;)) = Traces(Exp(PkU000;U00;;( ;));;( ;))
by Theorem .13 using lexicographic induction, as ( ;) >  .
If  6= ; then
Other cases are trivial.
76Theorem .13. If V ` Traces(P;; ) then V ` Traces(Exp(P;; );; ).
Proof: by lexicographic induction over ( ;P), where  ; 0 <  , and simultaneous induc-
tion with Lemma .12.
Case P  P1kP2 ^ @h: (h)  P
Exp(P1;P2;)  = next(Exp(P1;; );;;P2;; ;;) + next(Exp(P1;; );;;P2;; ;;)
Traces(Exp(P1kP2;; );; ) = intSingle(Exp(P1;P2;) )
= intSingle(next(Exp(P1;; );;;P2;; ;;))[
intSingle(next(Exp(P2;; );;;P1;; ;;))
Traces(P1kP2;; ) = intSubSet(Traces(P1;; );;;P2;; ;;)[
intSubSet(Traces(P2;; );;;P1;; ;;)
= intSubSet(Traces(Exp(P1;; );; );;;P2;; ;;)[
intSubSet(Traces(Exp(P1;; );; );;;P1;; ;;)
by the induction hypothesis
= intSingle(next(Exp(P1;; );;;P2;; ;;))[
intSingle(next(Exp(P2;; );;;P1;; ;;))
by Lemma .12
77Lemma .14. If A'(r;R(U)) simulates  with relation R then
8(q;) 2 R:q 6
L   ! )  6
L   !
Proof: contrapositive of 
L   !) q
L   !, which is easily derivable from the denition of
simulation.
Denition .15.  2 U if U;;

  ! ;R
Denition .16. O(U)
def = f0j 2 U ^ 0 is the largest prex of  s.t. init
0
  !
g
Denition .17. (U)
def = fA'(r0;R(U))jr0;' 2 Ug [ fA'(#;R(U))j' 2 Ug, where R(U)
comprises of #; , and all the static resources occurring in U
Theorem .18. Modied Theorem 2 from [7]
1. An initial usage U is valid i 80 2 O(U);8A'(r;R(U)) 2 (U):
[[B(0)]] / A'(r;R(U))WA#
2. The computational complexity of this method is PTIME in the size of U (but U is
exponential in the size of the P from which it was generated).
Theorem .19. Modied Theorem 2 from [5]
Let   ` e :  B U. Then:
1. ;R;e;init 6  !
 ;R;failK;
2. If U is valid then ;R;e;init 6  !
 ;R;fail'(r);
78Denition .20. OA'(r;R(U))(U)
def = f0j 2 U ^ 0 is largest prex of  s.t. q0
0
  !
g
Theorem .21. For each A'(r;R(U)) 2 (U) where A'(r;R(U)) simulates , if:
80 2 OA'(r;R(U))(U):[[B(0)]] / A'(r;R(U))WA#
then
80 2 O(U):[[B(0)]] / A'(r;R(U))WA#
Proof:
As A'(r;R(U)) simulates  using some relation R0 then, by Lemma .14:
8(q;) 2 R0:q 6
L   ! )  6
L   !
Hence the largest prex reducible in A'(r;R(U)) will conservatively approximate those
reducible in .
Hence if this larger set of traces is valid then the smaller subset of traces will also be
valid.
Note that we can generate some simulation relation using standard techniques such
as [19].
79